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TRANSPORTATION CONGESTION
I. TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND LAND USE PLANNING: THE QUALITY
OF LIFE CRISIS
A. The Adverse Impacts of Traffic Congestion
The growth of the nation's major metropolitan areas has over-
whelmed the capacity of federal, state and local governments to utilize
traditional capital improvement finance programs implemented through
the techniques of taxation, eminent domain and regulation to service the
growing population with adequate public facilities-particularly in trans-
portation.1 The automobile has exerted a tremendous influence over the
development of American cities and suburbs in this century. While the
automobile serves as the primary means of mobility, it is also a catalyst
for numerous land use problems. Such problems include traffic conges-
tion and deterioration of metropolitan air quality. Traffic congestion is a
function of the imbalance between the capacity of roadway facilities and
the demand for those facilities created by increasing automobile reliance
and new growth and development.
In many rapidly growing areas, citizens perceive traffic congestion
as the greatest public problem, outdistancing crime, the economy and
housing shortages.2 The political fallout caused by the failure of federal,
state and local governments to plan adequately for traffic congestion is
staggering.3 One consequence has been an explosion of anti-growth sen-
timent in some areas over the past several decades.4 Traffic congestion
now constitutes a predominant motivating factor behind recent growth
1. Freilich & Chinn, Transportation Corridors: Shaping and Financing Urbanization
Through Integration of Eminent Domain, Zoning and Growth Management Techniques, 55
UMKC L. REv. 153, 154 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Billiter, The Times Orange County Poll: Surf Drowns Out City's Drawbacks,
L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1991, at B1, col. 5 (Huntington Beach, Cal.); Schreiner, Traffic Conges-
tion Named Top Problem, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (San Francisco
Bay Area, Cal.). American cities face six major crises as a result of insensitive urbanization
policies within major metropolitan areas since 1965. These crises are central city decline, envi-
ronmental degradation, energy shortfall, fiscal insolvency and tax revolts, agricultural land
consumption and housing affordability. R. FREILICH & E. STUHLER, THE LAND USE AWAK-
ENING, ZONING LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 5 (1981); Freilich, Managing Energy Conservation
Under Planned Growth, in ENERGY & LAND USE 453, 454-56 (1982).
3. M. KAPLAN, HARD CHOICES, A SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE STUDY PREPARED FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 1, 2-3 (1984).
4. Cannon, Nevada, Fastest Census Gainer, Sees More Congestion, Pollution, Washington
Post, Jan. 7, 1991, at A4, col. 1 (Reno and Las Vegas, Nev.); Pelline, Changing Political Cli-
mate in an Anti-Growth City, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 7, 1991, at A6, col. 1 (Santa Barbara,
Cal.); Padilla, Mayor Insists Santa Clarita's Growth Is Under Control, L.A. Times, Sept. 21,
1990, at B4, col. 1 (Santa Clarita, Cal.); Yasuda, Home Costs Still Rise, But Pace Has Slowed,
L.A. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D2A, col. 1 (San Diego, Cal.); see Salvesen, Growth Manage-
ment Tempe Style, URB. LAND, Aug. 1990, at 20, 23.
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control movements in rapidly growing states such as California, Florida
and New Jersey.'
The United States Department of Transportation released a national
policy statement in 1990 identifying the continuing problems associated
with automobile congestion and encouraging governmental reliance on
user charges and transportation trust funds.' In 1987, over sixty-five per-
cent of peak-hour travel on urban interstates occurred under heavily con-
gested conditions.' Highway travel hours annually consume over two
billion hours and result in lost economic production.' Inefficient subur-
ban land development patterns are partly to blame. 9
Local governments can reduce or eliminate the environmental and
economic costs and the general deterioration in quality of life caused by
traffic congestion through the careful use of planning and growth man-
agement techniques. By addressing facility needs on a multi-modal basis
and by taking into consideration public policies affecting and affected by
traffic congestion-such as affordable housing and environmental con-
cerns-effective, comprehensive planning becomes possible.
The relationship between transportation facilities and development
is well established. New roadways are a major stimulant of develop-
If it is not careful, however, Tempe could become a victim of its own success. As
building densities rise to accommodate the influx of jobs and residents, so does the
number of cars on the roads. Tempe is already the most densely populated city in the
region. Its reliance on the automobile, coupled with cut-through traffic from neigh-
boring cities, has led to frequent traffic snarls and deteriorating air quality. And if
there is one thing that makes residents cry out for growth limits, it's traffic. Predicts
director of community development Terry Day, "I can see no-growth sentiment on
the horizon."
Salvesen, supra, at 23.
5. A recent survey of California cities identified quality of life and traffic reduction as the
predominant reasons for growth control measures. Glickfeld & Levine, The New Land Use
Regulation "Revolution'" Why California's Local Jurisdictions Enact Growth Control and
Management Measures, in EVALUATING LOCAL AND STATE GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAMS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OUR EXPERIENCE? 34-35 (1990); Bumper to Bumper
in the "Burbs, ZONING NEWS, Oct. 1987, at 1, 1-2; Cervero, Unlocking Suburban Gridlock, 52
J. AM. PLAN. A. 389, 403-04 (1986); DeGrove, The Battle Over Land Use: A Second Wave
Emerges, ST. GOV'T NEWS, May 1988, at 8, 9; Downs, The Real Problem with Suburban Anti-
Growth Policies, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1988, at 23, 23; Hull, Not in My Neighborhood,
TIME, Jan. 25, 1988, at 24, 24; Perlman, Traffic Tie-Ups Have Moved to the Suburbs, CITY &
STATE, May 23, 1988, at 3, 28; Skaggs, Walnut Creek Says Nuts to Growth, URB. LAND, Oct.
1988, at 34, 34; What's Happening to Our Town?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 1988, at 28, 29.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., MOVING AMERICA 5, 26-27 (Feb. 1990).
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id
9. Id at 25.
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ment. 1° The construction of roadways in outlying urban areas for the
past generation has fostered urban sprawl, which represents an inefficient
growth pattern with enormous economic, housing and environmental
costs. Furthermore, urban sprawl induces the consumption of natural
resources and environmentally sensitive land." Suburban low-density
shopping, office activity centers, and residential development also con-
tribute to traffic congestion.12 The traditional pattern of low-density resi-
dential development induces automobile reliance by consuming land on
the urban fringe and minimizing the density needed to make public
transit financially feasible.13 Consequently, such housing fails to facili-
tate public transportation.
Traffic congestion creates enormous societal costs in the form of en-
vironmental pollution, energy consumption, decreases in economic pro-
ductivity, and a general decline in citizens' quality of life. Automobile
fuel combustion emits pollutants such as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides
and hydrocarbons. 4 In the Southern California air basin alone, an esti-
mated eighty-seven percent of carbon monoxide emissions are caused by
fuel combustion from automobile use, 5 while fifty-two percent of nitro-
gen oxide-reactive organic emissions are caused by on- and off-road vehi-
10. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 231
(1968) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMM'N]; REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF
SPRAWL: LITERATURE REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 (1974).
11. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 795-97 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); R. FREILiCH & E. STUHLER, supra note 2, at 32-33; REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL: DETAILED COST ANALYSIS 4 (1974); see NOBLE, A PRO-
POSED SYSTEM FOR REGULATING LAND USE IN URBANIZING COUNTIES 16 (1967). Noble
noted that:
Controlling sprawl by redirecting growth would benefit existing central city and sub-
urban dwellers, would be environmentally beneficial by preserving agricultural land
and open space, aid in reducing energy consumption and would by limiting the area
over which services must be extended, reduce the cost of services to suburbanites and
aid in the fiscal solvency of local governments.
IM at 16.
12. Yarrow, Commuters Agonize as Road Repairs Spread, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1990, at
Al, col. 2. "Despite one of the nation's most extensive mass-transit networks and relatively
slow population growth, traffic in the New York region increased substantially in the 1980's
[sic], largely because of greater commuting from one suburb to another, rather than to and
from New York City. Yarrow notes a sense of urgency that if the region's traffic problems are
not eased soon, it will pay a price in quality of life and economic competitiveness." Id.; see
also Weiner, Please Stay, Morgan Stanley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at A19, col. 1 (lamenting
overdevelopment in Stamford, Conn.).
13. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DOES CALIFORNIA NEED A POLICY TO MANAGE
URBAN GROWTH?: A REPORT FROM THE CALIFORNIA SENATE URBAN GROWTH POLICY
PROJECT 24-25 (June 1989) [hereinafter PRESLEY REPORT].
14. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 146-48 (1990).
15. 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51-52).
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eles.16 Moreover, "[transportation accounts for more than a quarter of
total national energy consumption and close to two-thirds of the petro-
leum used in the United States each year."
17
Land use policies and concomitant growth patterns marked by in-
creasing suburbanization, decentralization and a jobs-housing imbal-
ance, 8 substantially contribute to traffic congestion. Additionally,
federal funding for mass transit and other traffic systems management
programs has declined dramatically during the past decade. Structural
solutions, such as freeway construction, high-occupancy vehicle lanes
and ramp metering, are increasingly recognized as ineffective when used
in isolation.
The purpose of this Article is to describe how structural engineer-
ing,19 public finance2 ° and regulatory control alternatives21 must be
jointly used to combat traffic congestion. The traditional government re-
sponse to traffic congestion has been to use one category in isolation-
most notably, the expansion or construction of highways. Instead of
considering these techniques in isolation, state and local governments
16. Id.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at 99; see also Freilich, supra note 2, at 453 -54
(post-war energy abundance contributed to metropolitan sprawl).
18. A jobs-housing imbalance occurs where an area or region lacks sufficient housing
opportunities for persons working there, or where an area or region lacks sufficient employ-
ment opportunities for persons living there. SOUTHERN CAL. Ass'N OF Gov'Ts, REGIONAL
GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN VI-1 (1989). A recent report authored by California State
Senator Robert Presley (D-Riverside), contends that:
As jobs and housing continue to spread further apart, average commute time
statewide could increase from 45 minutes today to two hours in the next twenty
years ....
According to the Association of Bay Area Governments, housing demand in the
Bay Area will total 440,000 new units over the next fifteen years, to meet the needs of
new residents and changing household characteristics. Much of this demand is gen-
erated by employment growth from commercial development, especially in the
Silicon Valley and other major employment centers. Yet local government plans
would allow at most 380,000 units in the same time period, much of it in areas such
as Solano and Sonoma Counties remote from growing job centers. The result is a
jobs/housing imbalance, and rapid growth in Tracy, Manteca and other Central Val-
ley communities as housing demand spills over from the Bay Area.
PRESLEY REPORT, supra note 13, at 13, 16 (footnote omitted).
19. Structural engineering alternatives generally include the construction, reconstruction
or reconfiguration of existing and programmed transportation facilities. See infra notes 54-67
and accompanying text.
20. Public finance alternatives include the use of revenue-raising devices to finance the
acquisition of land and the construction or improvement of capital facilities needed to alleviate
congestion. See infra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
21. Regulatory control alternatives involve the use of police power techniques by state and
local governments to mitigate the effect of new and existing development on transportation
facilities. See infra notes 100-296 and accompanying text.
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should use a combination of techniques under each category in order to
develop a truly effective, comprehensive strategy addressing traffic con-
gestion. Government must apply land use and public finance mecha-
nisms as part of a comprehensive program to resolve traffic congestion
and resultant air quality degradation.
B. The Relationship Between Traffic Congestion and Land Use
The relationship between traffic congestion and economic growth
and development is well documented.22 As a result, developers and local
governments commonly institute cooperative financing arrangements,
benefit assessment districts, impact fees, joint development and voluntary
associations to add roadway capacity and to encourage the use of mass
transit.23 Furthermore, traffic congestion is a major factor in the quality
of life in a city. Congestion contributes to neighborhood deterioration,
psychological discomfort, increased response times for police, fire and
medical services, and reduced economic productivity and mobility.
Increases in traffic congestion are caused by a combination of fac-
tors, including land use patterns, changes in travel behavior and modal
split.24 Urban decentralization and the imbalance between jobs and
housing are major contributors to congestion. Population growth on the
urban fringe increases trip lengths to job destinations in the urban core
and introduces congestion to once-quiet suburban neighborhoods. In ad-
dition, the imbalance between jobs and housing forces consumers to in-
22. Planners and market researchers utilize standardized models involving the spatial rela-
tionship between trip generators and trip attractors to predict the level of economic activity in
a given area. This is normally referred to as the "gravity" model. F. CHAPIN & E. KAISER,
URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 545-57 (3d ed. 1979).
23. See Freilich & Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing Valid Development Exac-
tions: Responding to Nollan, 10 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 169, 174-75 (1987); Orski, Subur-
ban Mobility: The Coming Transportation Crisis?, 12 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 383, 388-96
(1986). For example, in Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, the building industry
defended the use of a regional impact fee used to fund nearly 60% of the cost of three freeways
in Orange County, California. 45 Cal. 3d 491, 498-99, 754 P.2d 708, 711-12, 247 Cal. Rptr.
362, 365-66 (1988); see also Orski, supra, at 390 (fees assessed on developments located within
highway corridors in proportion to projected traffic attributable to each development). Simi-
larly, in J W. Jones Com v. City of San Diego, the Construction Industry Federation and the
Building Industry Association filed amicus curiae briefs in defense of an innovative financial
technique, called a facilities benefit assessment, which combines the features of traditional as-
sessment and impact fees. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984). The facilities
benefit assessment required developers to participate in the pro-rata cost of new capital facili-
ties necessitated by new development. Id. at 749-50, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 583. For a discussion of
facility benefit assessments, see D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 11, at 388-94.
24. "Modal split" refers to the distribution of trips between alternative transportation
models, such as automobile and transit. CALTRANS, CONGESTION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
RESOURCE HANDBOOK app. C-5 (1990).
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crease automobile trip lengths on freeways.25 Suburban employment
centers, with their liberal parking requirements and auto-intensive com-
mercial and retail uses, create an incentive for congestion by making
automobile commuting more attractive than public transit.26 Decentrali-
zation and the jobs-housing imbalance, when combined with the relative
accessibility of automobiles and fuel, have combined to make the United
States the most auto-reliant nation in the world.2 7
The financial structure of transportation planning also adds to urban
sprawl and traffic congestion. By failing to tax the inefficiencies of
sprawl, federal, state and local governments overlook important sources
of funds for public transit.21 Most noticeable is the evisceration of fed-
eral support from the Urban Mass Transit Act.29 Such a reduction of
funds is unfortunate since the construction of public transit could pro-
mote growth in urban centers while discouraging urban sprawl and
decentralization.
C. Lack of Regional, State or Federal Solutions
Roads do not generally stop at municipal borders; therefore, trans-
portation is widely viewed as a regional problem. Effective solutions to
the traffic congestion quandary, however, have not emerged from federal
or state governments. Despite the rising interest in regional and state-
wide controls in many regions, little has been done to change the funda-
mental fact that the regulation of land use resides primarily at the local
level.3" State and regional land use controls have been confined to signifi-
cant environmental and natural resources.31
25. R. CERVERO, SUBURBAN GRIDLOCK 73-79 (1986).
26. See R. CERVERO, AMERICA'S SUBURBAN CENTERS: A STUDY OF THE LAND USE-
TRANSPORTATION LINK 34-41 (1988).
27. See Pucher, Capitalism, Socialism, and Urban Transportation: Policies and Travel Be-
havior in the East and West, 56 J. AM. PLAN. A. 278 (1990).
28. Some local governments, however, have considered higher parking fees and other
charges as a means to reduce traffic. See, eg., MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T,
MARYLAND-NAT'L CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMM'N, ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTA-
TION SCENARIOS AND STAGING CEILINGS 41-42 (proposing parking fee increases, set-asides at
parking garages for high-occupancy and private parking tax).
29. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1601-1621 (1988).
30. See, eg., 36 D. FRIZELL & H. POZYCKI, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE III 18A (1989).
31. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978) (state land use
controls over areas of "critical state concern" defined, in part, as area containing environmen-
tal, historical, natural or archeological resources); California Coastal Zone Management Act,
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (created coastal commis-
sion with oversight powers on any development impinging on coastal recreation areas, the
marine environment and land resources); see also F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS 3-4 (1972) (state and regional land use controls result
from growing awareness that states are the only political entities capable of devising innovative
[Vol. 24:915
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The issue of whether land use controls should be exercised at the
local or regional level has been raised in nearly every major land use
decision.32 Metropolitan regional solutions originated with the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1962, 33 which provided that federal funding for ur-
ban highways must be "based on a continuing comprehensive planning
process."34 Nevertheless, regional oversight of highway construction has
gradually eroded,35 thereby leading to the non-binding oversight of local
metropolitan planning organizations.36
The federal regulations implementing the transportation planning
requirement were amended in 1975. 37 The 1975 regulations mandated a
techniques to solve problems such as pollution and destruction of fragile natural resources); J.
DEGROVE, LAND GROWTH & POLITICS 99-108, 177-234 (1984) (describing how Florida and
California developed comprehensive land use controls in response to compelling state wide
environmental concerns). See generally Fulton, In Land-Use Planning, a Second Revolution
Shifts Control to the States, GOVERNING, Mar. 1989, at 40.
32. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) (zoning
ordinance of suburb valid where it diverted development coming from adjoining larger city);
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 604, 557 P.2d 473, 486, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41, 54 (1976) (local initiative ordinance to limit issuance of building permits up-
held); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 238, 456
A.2d 390, 430 (1983) (regional general welfare is mandatory, not permissive); Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 383, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 158
(inadequate local resources sufficient to justify zoning ordinance), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
33. Pub. L. No. 87-866, § 9(a), 76 Stat. 1145, 1148 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) (1988)).
34. Id.
35. The decline of truly effective regional planning is demonstrated by the demise of the A-
95 review process. Prompted by the rise of councils of governments and regional planning
agencies in the 1960s, the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular
No. A-95, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-95 (1969), under the au-
thority of section 401(c)(3) of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4231(c) (repealed 1982), and section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan De-
velopment Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 3334 (1989). Brussat, A-95 Review System: Can Be an
Asset, in 3 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 298, 298 (1975). Circular No. A-95
required the review of local and private applications for federal assistance by state and regional
agencies acting as clearinghouses. D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 181 (2d ed. 1983). Although clearinghouse
comments were merely advisory and not binding on applicants or federal agencies, the process
allowed a wide range of interested jurisdictions affected by a potential project to review and
comment on the potential effects. Id. However, Circular No. A-95 was revoked by the Reagan
Administration in 1983. Executive Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1983), reprinted in 31
U.S.C. § 6506 (1988).
36. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are advisory planning organizations
created by states in order to receive funds and to develop transportation plans and transporta-
tion improvement programs pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, 23 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) (1990), and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1621
(1990). See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 279E-1 (1985).
37. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 450.100-.320 (1976); 49 C.F.R. §§ 613.100-.300 (1976).
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comprehensive planning process containing: (1) an analysis of the
economic and environmental effects of highway construction; (2) coordi-
nation with air quality planning; (3). public involvement; (4) considera-
tions of civil rights; (5) mass transit with special services for the elderly
and handicapped; (6) energy conservation; (7) an analysis of existing
private mass transit services; and, (8) technical activities.38
The planning process was to identify alternative transportation sys-
tem management improvements and achieve consistency with local land
use and urban planning goals, transportation corridors, staging policies
and urban development monitoring.39 The process was to culminate in a
comprehensive transportation plan, with a transportation system man-
agement (TSM) element, as well as a long-range planning element. 4° The
TSM element would identify short-range transportation needs, methods
effectively to utilize existing road capacity, engineering capabilities, pub-
lie transit, regulatory and pricing schemes, management, operations and
other techniques.4 1 The long-range element would identify long-range
transportation needs, policies and changes in major facilities.42 The plan
was to be consistent with local comprehensive land use planning and ur-
ban development objectives, overall social, economic and environmental
needs and energy conservation objectives.43 The 1975 regulations were
substantially eroded during the Reagan Administration.'
The absence of federal leadership in the area of land use controls is
also illustrated by the failure of transportation control plans (TCPs)
under the Clean Air Act4' to gain political acceptability. The 1977
Amendments to the Clean Air Act removed language that authorized the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require states to include
38. 23 C.F.R. § 450.120 (1976).
39. Id
40. Iad § 450.116.
41. Id. § 450.116(b).
42. Id. § 450.116(c).
43. Id. § 450.116(d).
44. See id. §§ 450.100-.114 (1981) (requiring comprehensive transportation planning pro-
cess resulting in development of urbanized area as condition to receiving federal operating
assistance); 23 C.F.R. §§ 450.200-.212 (1983) (establishing regulations for content of transpor-
tation improvement program in urbanized area); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.,
THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 69-70 (1984). See Citizens Comm.
Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Ohio 1982), for an illustration
of the process of planning and constructing a major highway against the backdrop of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988), and how the federal
requirements changed during the Reagan Administration.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1989); 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01-52.29 (1976). The TCPs were ele-
ments of state implementation plans (SIPs) representing states' proposed efforts to achieve
compliance with federally mandated air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
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TCPs in their state implementation plans (SIPs).4 Only recently has the
Clean Air Act been amended to deal with the air quality impacts of traf-
fic congestion.47 The Environmental Protection Agency, however, con-
tinues to recognize that local government is the appropriate forum for
implementing transportation-related land use controls.48
States almost universally delegate land use control powers to local
governments.49 A handful of states have adopted vertically integrated
planning systems,5" while others, such as California, have mandatory
planning.5' The primary responsibility for the implementation of state,
regional and local land use goals, however, lies with local governments.52
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
47. The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments require states containing "Serious," "Severe" or
"Extreme" ozone non-attainment areas to include designated transportation control measures
in their SIPs, including mandatory transportation demand management for certain employers.
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 103, 104 Stat. 2399, 2423 -52. See also infra notes 256-82 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of transportation demand management.
48. See 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51-52) (recognizing
value of local initiatives by approving in part and disapproving in part California's SIP for the
South Coast Air Basin, and acknowledging infeasibility of federally-implemented land use con-
trol alternatives).
49. D. FRIZELL & H. PozycKi, supra note 30, at III 18A.
50. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 197.005-215.337 (1985 & Supp. 1990); OREGON LAND CONSERVATION & DEv.
COMM'N, OREGON LAND USE GOALS AND GUIDELINES REGULATIONS, reprinted in [6 State
Solid Waste-Land Use] Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1286:2501-:2525 (Sept. 21, 1990). Vertically
integrated planning systems involve state wide planning agencies, which prescribe planning
goals and objectives. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005(2), (4). The systems also provide for review
of state agency, city, county and special district land conservation and development plans. Id
51. See, e-g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30009 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 7001-7013 (1985 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-380.12 (West 1988); see
Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 167 n.54. Most states limit the regional planning mecha-
nisms to non-urban critical or environmental areas. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800-
67132 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991) (creating the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency to preserve
scenic beauty and recreational opportunities); Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Act, NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 277.190-.200 (Michie 1990) (creating the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency to preserve natural beauty and economic productivity of region); New Jersey Hacken-
sack Meadowlands Development Commission Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West
1979 & Supp. 1990) (creating the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission to
oversee conservation of salt water swamps, meadows and marshes); New Jersey Pinelands Pro-
tection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A-1 to -49 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990) (creating the Pine-
lands Environmental Council to protect water resources and natural assets of Pinelands
region); New Jersey Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21
(West 1979 & Supp. 1990) (authorizing state Department of Environmental Protection to re-
view existing facilities' pollution impact on coastal areas); New York Adirondack Park
Agency Act, N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 800-820 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (creating the
Adirondack Park Agency to preserve natural resources and open space in Adirondack Park);
North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 113A-100
to -134 (Michie 1990) (creating the Coastal Resources Advisory Council to preserve coastal
areas, particularly estuaries).
52. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 11, at 901.
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Consequently, the issue of regionalism is generally raised as a red herring
by developers or landowners contesting a local regulatory scheme, rather
than as a means to encourage development of regional institutions to deal
with transportation problems. 3 Until effective regional planning and im-
plementation becomes a reality, such a position would leave citizens en-
tirely unprotected from the adverse affects of unregulated development.
II. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES: ADDING CAPACITY THROUGH
CONSTRUCTION, ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC FLOW
MEASURES
A. New Construction and Use of Existing Capacity
The traditional solution to traffic congestion has been to construct
new roadways. This solution, however, is no longer viable in many situa-
tions because of financial constraints, environmental restrictions, com-
munity opposition to roadway expansion and changing traffic patterns.
54
In fact, it is well established that construction of additional roadways
often exacerbates congestion by making travel by automobile more
accessible. 5
As an alternative to roadway expansion, transportation engineers
and planners have devised methods to alter travel behavior and traffic
patterns by changing the ways in which roadways are used. Supply-side
mechanisms to increase the effective capacity of roadways, without build-
ing or expanding roadways, are commonly referred to as TSM."6 TSMs
generally includes the following measures: (1) congestion detection and
53. Ironically, while developers often challenge local growth controls on regional rational
basis and general welfare grounds, a study commissioned by a group of home builders in re-
sponse to Florida's vertically integrated planning system has recently called for "[mlore direct,
local control." Orosz, New Governor Reviews Florida Growth Law, PLANNING, Jan. 1991, at
30, 30.
54. Kozlak, Traffic Congestion: A Major Public Policy Issue in the Twin Cities Area, 10
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 219, 223 (1989); Weiner, supra note 12, at A19, col. 1.
55. See Kolata, What if They Closed 42d Street and Nobody Noticed?, N.Y. Times, Dec.
25, 1990 (Science), at 14, col.1.
56. The California Streets and Highways Code defines TSM projects as "those projects
designed to increase the number of person-trips which can be carried on the highway system in
a peak period without significantly increasing the designed capacity of the highway system
when measured by the number of vehicle-trips and without increasing the number of through
traffic lanes." CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 164.1 (West 1990). Flexible congestion relief
projects are defined as "those projects designed to reduce or avoid traffic congestion on existing
routes by increasing the capacity of the transportation system, including new facilities." Id.
§ 164.2. TSM differs from transportation demand management (TDM) policies in that it at-
tempts to influence travel behavior through supply-side policies, such as by reserving highway
lanes for carpools. TDM policies are designed to directly influence the demand side of traffic
congestion through the land development or regulatory process. See infra notes 256-82 and
accompanying text.
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monitoring systems; (2) ramp metering; (3) high-occupancy vehicle
lanes; (4) freeway diversion; (5) signalization improvements; (6) revers-
ible traffic lanes; and, (7) parking management.5 7 While such solutions
should be a part of any transportation congestion management program,
they are ineffective in rapidly growing areas, absent growth management
controls.
B. Organizing Frameworks
1. Capital improvement programming
A capital improvement program (CIP) is a schedule of capital im-
provements to be provided over a definite period of time."8 CIPs show
the location and cost of the proposed facility construction; expansions in
facility capacity; the need for such facilities; when the facilities will be
provided; the sources available for financing the facility additions;
adopted level of service standards; and, a statement of the capacity pro-
vided by programmed facility expansions.5 9 The CIP may also include a
long-term capital facilities plan to be implemented by a series of short-
term, staged budgets.
The CIP is an essential component of any structural, public finance
or regulatory program, and particularly of any growth management pro-
gram tying development approval to the adequacy of public facilities sup-
porting new development.' If growth management programs are
57. See generally INsTruTE OF TRANSp. ENG'RS, A TOOLBOX FOR ALLEVIATING TRAF-
FIC CONGESTION (1989) (discussing coordinated plan to alleviate traffic congestion); SOUTH
CoAsT AIR QUALnTY MANAGEMENT DIST. & SOUTHERN CAL. ASS'N OF GOv'Ts, AIR
QuALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN (Mar. 1989) (discussing Air Quality Management Plan).
58. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(3) (West Supp. 1990).
59. See, eg., id. § 163.3177(3)(a).
60. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 11, at 836; see Golden v. Planning Bd. of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972). Golden established the constitutionality of adding sequencing and timing dimensions
to land use regulation, in addition to the traditional use and location controls. The Golden
plan linked the availability of adequate public facilities to development potential by pacing
subdivision approval with an eighteen-year CIP within a comprehensive plan. Id. at 368-69,
285 N.E.2d at 295-96, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44. The case was of critical constitutional signifi-
cance because it enlarged the concept of "reasonable use" enunciated in Village of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), to that of reasonable use over a reasonable period of time, as measured by a compre-
hensive plan. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155-56. After a
comprehensive survey of commentators and land use practitioners, Dozier and Hagman
ranked Golden as the most significant land use regulation case, next to Village of Euclid. Do-
zier & Hagman, Ranking Land Development and Environmental Cases and Courts, 4 ENVTL.
COMMENT 4 (1978).
Professor Freilich, who authored the Golden plan, drafted the ordinance and argued the
case through the courts, has elaborated on the development of the case and its constitutional
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coupled with a realistic CIP, courts will presume that local governments
provided the facilities and services needed for growth in good faith.61
CIPs may also form the basis for development exactions, conditioning
development approval on the provision of public facilities and services in
proportion to the impact created by the new development.62 If a growth
control mechanism is ostensibly based on public facility concerns, yet is
not supported by a realistic CIP, courts are likely to be skeptical of the
program's underlying motives and may invalidate it on exclusionary zon-
ing or takings grounds.6
2. Transportation corridors
Both transportation corridors" and CIPs can serve as unifying
frameworks for the construction and use of transportation facilities, fi-
nancing mechanisms and regulatory techniques. Transportation corri-
dors serve as an organizing framework for financial and growth
management tools by:
(1) ... acting as the focus for coordinated transportation im-
provements within major travel corridors and enhancing
system efficiency;
(2) [p]romot[ing] the development of multi-modal transporta-
tion systems that integrate highways, air, mass transit and
other transportation modes;
significance. See Freilich & Greis, Timing and Sequencing Development: Controlling Growth,
in FUTURE LAND USE, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 59, 65-84
(1975); Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective
Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-
St Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1011 (1974). See also infra notes 140-
255 and accompanying text for a discussion of adequate public facilities ordinances.
61. See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Beaver Meadows
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985). See infra notes 107-10 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of developer exactions.
63. See, e.g., Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (D.R.I. 1986); Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 604-07, 557 P.2d 473, 486-87, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 54-55 (1976); Westwood Forest Estates v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
428, 244 N.E.2d 700, 702, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1969).
64. A transportation corridor is a specific geographic area containing the maximum right-
of-way needed to meet projected population and employment growth, and encompassing all
adjacent areas impacted by the corridor plan and reasonably necessary to accomplish it.
Freiich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 165. The transportation corridor concept relies upon ad-
vance acquisition through eminent domain, freeing the public sector from the "necessity" limi-
tation on eminent domain and demonstrating a present need for the proposed acquisition.
Callies & Duerksen, Value Recapture as a Source of Funds to Finance Public Projects, 8 URn.
L. ANN. 73, 81-82 (1974); see Department of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 532
So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1988) (recognizing cost savings as legitimate public purpose in excess
condemnation).
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(3) [p]romot[ing] a comprehensive transportation planning
process which coordinates state, regional and local trans-
portation plans;
(4) [a]ssist[ing] in the construction of infrastructure, including
state, county and local streets and highways through fees
generated by new developments... ;
(5) [r]educ[ing] . . . the costs for acquisition of right-of-way
and construction of new and expanded transportation
facilities;
(6) [a]ct[ing] as a focus for joint public-private development at
major interchanges or multi-modal junctions to enhance
the state's economic and development activity, including
research, technology, office, commercial and industrial site
location in order to promote the expansion of employment
and assure the continued growth of the.., economy;
(7) being the site for higher density residential development,
including affordable housing, day care centers, public and
non-profit service facilities, housing and accessible facilities
for the elderly and handicapped;
(8) [p]rotect[ing] . . . fragile environmental and natural re-
sources... including agricultural lands, open space, scenic
vistas and historic or archaeologically significant properties
and sites, through cluster development, average density,
planned unit development, air rights transfers and transfers
of development capacity from non-corridor areas to appro-
priate recipient areas within transportation corridors; and
(9) [a]ssist[ing] in the maintenance of clear distinctions be-
tween urban and non-urban areas to provide effective
growth management in accordance with the goals and
objectives of the [comprehensive] plan, including but not
limited to energy conservation, efficient provision of capital
infrastructure and governmental services, and enhanced de-
velopment of existing built-up urban areas of the state.65
Broad-based planning efforts that integrate transportation conges-
tion solutions with broader planning objectives, such as adopting goals to
65. Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 170 -71; see also Montgomery County v. Woodward
& Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 693-94, 376 A.2d 483, 488 (1977) (upholding comprehensive
downzoning to implement "wedges and corridors" strategy designed to increase densities
along major transportation corridors and to preserve areas between corridors).
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combat the six major urban crises,6 make the congestion management
program more effective and legally defensible. Such efforts enhance not
only the structural mechanisms, but also the financial and regulatory
mechanisms, by reasonably advancing the legitimate public purpose of
alleviating traffic congestion.67
III. PUBLIC FINANCE ALTERNATIVES
Enormous backlogs in roadway and public transit needs, the rising
costs of construction and maintenance, and voter resistance to ad
valorem property and sales tax increases, have forced local governments
to search for new ways to finance transportation facilities. While some
local governments have found novel ways to apply established tech-
niques, such as special assessments, new devices are also emerging to
fund transportation facilities. Although local governments have success-
fully exercised their police powers 68 to recover the public facility costs
necessitated by new development, the legal constraints associated with
this technique triggered a search for additional funding sources. This
section describes the innovative revenue-raising techniques being used to
fund the capital and maintenance costs of transportation.
A. Special Assessments
Special assessments are revenue-raising devices designed to recover
the cost of capital improvements directly benefiting properties within a
designated "benefit area."69 They may be collected from owners of both
new and existing developments. Unlike impact fees and mandatory dedi-
cations imposed under a local government's police and land use control
powers, special assessments may be used to pay for existing infrastruc-
ture deficiencies.
66. These crises are: central city decline, environmental degradation, energy shortfall, fis-
cal insolvency, agricultural land consumption and lack of affordable housing. See R.
FREILICH & E. STUHLER, supra note 2, at 5.
67. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-38; see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)
(police power measures valid if they adopt reasonable means to lawful end).
68. Police power exactions such as mandatory dedications and impact fees imposed as a
condition of land development approval are not taxation devices. Such exactions are designed
to recover the cost of capital facilities necessitated by the regulatory approval of new develop-
ment. Accordingly, these techniques are described separately. For a discussion of impact fees,
see infra notes 289-96 and accompanying text. For a discussion of mandatory dedications, see
infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
69. 14 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW O MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 77-78 (3. Reinholtz 3d
ed. 1987).
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In San Diego, special assessments and impact fees are integrated
with the city's "tiered" growth management system.7" New develop-
ments within the planned urbanizing area (PUA) are required to partici-
pate in the financing of public infrastructure needs.7" The tier system
divides San Diego into three areas: (1) the Urbanized Area, including
the central city and built-up areas, in which growth is actively en-
couraged; (2) the PUA, in which land is opened for urbanization in a
staged, continuous manner through the orderly extension of public facili-
ties; and, (3) Future Urbanizing Areas, where land is held in "urban re-
serve," pending the development of the PUA. The city's facilities benefit
assessment (FBA) is a special assessment applied to new development in
the PUA that apportions the cost of traffic, park, library, school, fire and
other facilities to each new unit of residential, commercial and industrial
development. 72 Payment of the FBA is postponed until the building-per-
mit stage and is enforceable by a lien on the property. Use of FBAs from
1979 to 1983 resulted in a major shift in development to the Urbanized
Area, thereby achieving one of the major goals of San Diego's 1979 Gen-
eral Plan.73
Special assessments are generally available only for capital improve-
ments that "directly benefit" property within a delineated benefit area, in
contrast to "general improvements" conferring area-wide benefits. As a
result, using special assessments for major public projects may pose
unique problems. For example, courts have split on the issue of whether
a "special benefit" can be shown for the construction of a city-wide or
regional mass transit system.74
70. R. FREILICH, A FIVE-TIERED GROwTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SAN DIEGO
2-7 to 2-11 (1976).
71. Id.; see Witt & Sammartino, Facility Financing in the 1990s: The Second Step in Ur-
ban Growth Management, 38 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMp. L. 115 (1990).
72. San Diego's FBA was challenged on state constitutional grounds and upheld in the
California appellate courts. City of San Diego v. Holodnak, 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 763, 203
Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (1984); J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 757-
58, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580, 589 (1984).
73. Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 164 n.52. The General Plan's goal was to redistrib-
ute growth and transfer a greater portion of new growth to the urbanized area. Id. Growth in
the city over that period increased from 9,000 building permits per year, of which only 900
were in the 100 square mile Urbanized Area, to 16,000 building permits per year, with more
than 50% in the Urbanized Area. This increase in the number of permits granted revitalized
the depressed neighborhoods in the downtown and waterfront areas. Id.
74. Compare Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 147 (special assessment district to finance 18.6 mile subway connection from Los Ange-
les to North Hollywood held to be violation of equal protection clause of fourteenth amend-
ment), review granted, 797 P.2d 1179, 274 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990) with Anema v. Transit Constr.
Auth., 788 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1990) (assessments for construction of fixed rail rapid transit
system held valid special fee) and Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d
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B. Transportation Utility Fees
Transportation utility fees (TUFs) are recent innovations that cap-
ture the costs of street operations and maintenance from both existing
and new development.7" Unlike special assessments, TUFs may be used
to recover operation and maintenance costs and need not be tied to direct
benefits received from the use of roadways within a local jurisdiction.
A TUF, which applied only to developed properties, was adopted in
1984 by Fort Collins, Colorado and recently upheld by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Bloom v. City of Fort Collins. 76 A Transportation Util-
ity was created within a special services fund for maintaining local
streets.77 The TUF was calculated by multiplying a city-wide "base rate"
per foot of frontage by a "traffic generation factor," which varied de-
pending upon whether the property was single-family residential, multi-
family residential or non-residential.78 For lots using utilities, the fee was
billed with the normal monthly utility bill; lots not using utilities were
billed separately.7 9 These fees were enforceable through a lien on the
property.A0 The revenues generated by the fees were used for the "cost of
operation, administration, maintenance, repair, improvement, renewal,
replacement and reconstruction of the local street network of the city
and costs incidental thereto." 81
The Bloom court considered whether the fee could be classified as
an ad valorem tax, excise tax, special assessment or special fee. 2 First,
the court rejected the classification of the fee as an ad valorem tax be-
cause it was not calculated on the basis of property value.8 3 Second, clas-
sification as an excise tax was similarly rejected on the basis that the fee
was not "conditioned on the performance of an act, event, or occur-
rence."84 Finally, the court dismissed the classification of the fee as a
special assessment because the maintenance of streets throughout Fort
491, 754 P.2d 708, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1988) (upholding regional freeway impact fees for
Orange County).
75. Cf Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wash. 2d 227, 704 P.2d 1171 (1985) (upholding drain-
age utility fee).
76. 784 P.2d 305, - (Colo. 19-).
77. FORT COLLINS, COLO. CODE § 108A-1 (1984).
78. Id. § 108A-7.
79. Id. § 108A-8.
80. Id § 108A-10.
81. Id § 108A-8. The code provision allowed excess revenues to be applied to "any other
fund of the city." Id This particular provision was invalidated and severed from the remain-
der of the ordinance. Bloom, 784 P.2d at 311.
82. Bloom, 784 P.2d at 307-09.
83. Id. at 309.
84. Id at 310.
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Collins did not, as noted on the face of the ordinance, enhance the value
of particular properties.85 Instead, the court concluded that the fee was a
"special fee."8 6
Upholding the special fee, the court found that the fee was "reason-
ably designed to meet the overall cost of the service for which the fee
[was] imposed."' 87 In addition, the owners of properties within Fort Col-
lins were found to have received a benefit from the maintenance of city
streets, because of the "access to and from residences, buildings, and
other areas within [Fort Collins]."' 88 The court declined to invalidate the
fee on the ground that it was involuntary, distinguishing cases applying
this standard on the ground that those cases arose within the context of
statutory authority.89
C. Development Excise Taxes
A number of cities collect excise taxes on the business of real estate
development to raise revenues for public facilities.90 Unlike impact fees
or mandatory dedication, the use of excise taxes avoids the need for stud-
ies to determine the nexus between transportation facilities and new de-
velopment.91 In order to survive judicial scrutiny, the municipality must
have authority to enact the excise tax.92 Furthermore, the tax must be
designed to raise revenue for a legitimate public purpose, rather than to
regulate land use.93 Because the express purpose of a tax is to raise reve-
nue, the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 310-11.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 310 n.8 (citing National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336,
341 (1974); Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); City of
Vanceburg v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comnm'n, 571 F.2d 630, 644 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978)). This conclusion directly contradicts the recent decision in
Eastern Diversified Properties v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45, 55, 570 A.2d 850, 855
(1990) (invalidating county's impact fees as involuntary tax). Because Fort Collins is a home
rule city, the court had little trouble with the question of authority. See Bloom, 784 P.2d at
305-08.
90. See, eg., City of Mesa v. Home Builders Ass'n, 111 Ariz. 29, 523 P.2d 57 (1974);
Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 36 (1977); Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1962); Cherry Hills Farm v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 670 P.2d 779 (Colo.
1983); Oregon State Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Tigard, 43 Or. App. 791, 604 P.2d 886
(1979); BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE §§ 3-8-1 to 3-8-8 (1987).
91. Strauss & Leitner, Financing Public Facilities with Development Excise Taxes: An Al-
ternative to Exactions and Impact Fees, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. RP. 17, 21-22 (1988).
92. City of Mesa, 111 Ariz. at 30, 523 P.2d at 58.
93. Strauss & Leitner, supra note 91, at 19-22.
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tion are rarely used to invalidate a tax solely because of its magnitude.94
In states with special tax limitations, such as California, an excise tax
may require voter approval. 95
D. Joint Development
Joint development 96 may be used along state and interstate high-
ways, transit stations on mass transit lines and multi-modal connection
points within transportation corridors. Development activity along these
points is attractive because of the presence of transportation facilities.97
Local governments may initiate partnerships with private developers
through the advance acquisition of parcels surrounding transportation
facilities. Revenues may be derived from lease revenues, connection fees,
concession fees and negotiated private sector investments, such as right-
of-way dedications.98 While the money must be expended for a public
rather than a private purpose,99 it may be used flexibly as a source of
funds for all types of public facility needs. The earmarking and propor-
tionality limitations applicable to impact fees do not apply to revenues
derived from joint development projects.
IV. REGULATORY CONTROLS
Transportation facility backlogs in rapidly growing areas have been
exacerbated by the demand for roadways and public transit created by
new development. As soaring population growth and urban decentrali-
zation have precipitated a decline in service levels on roadways, local
governments have searched for ways to manage the traffic impacts of new
growth and development. The use of land use controls to alleviate traffic
congestion raises unique questions of statutory authority and constitu-
tional interpretation. While "traditional" techniques, such as zoning and
subdivision controls, have long been applied to combat traffic congestion,
these techniques often fail and, as in the case of large-lot zoning, may
94. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373 (1974); A. Magnano Co.
v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
411 (1928); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1921); Tanque
Verde Enters. v. City of Tucson, 142 Ariz. 536, 540, 691 P.2d 302, 306 (1984).
95. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIA, § 1; see Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 176.
96. Joint development is "the pairing and cooperation of public and private resources to
achieve an end that will benefit both the private developer and the public sector." Freilich &
Nichols, Public-Private Partnership in Joint Development: The Legal and Financial Anatomy of
Large Scale Urban Projects, 7 MuN. FIN. J. 5, 6 (1986).
97. Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 183.
98. Id at 187 n.1 13; Freilich & Nichols, supra note 96, at 6-7.
99. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 825 U.S. 825, 841 (1987); U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
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even exacerbate the traffic congestion problem. Accordingly, new tech-
niques, such as adequate public facilities and transportation systems
management ordinances, have emerged.
A. First-Generation Land Use Control Techniques
1. Zoning
From the promulgation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act in
192 4 ,1°° courts have consistently approved the use of zoning to alleviate
traffic congestion. 10 1 Zoning techniques typically include use districting,
density and lot regulations, and parking requirements.
Zoning techniques-especially large-lot zoning-have come under
increasing criticism because of their negative effects on traffic congestion.
Many commentators and planning experts now assert that large-lot zon-
ing actually induces traffic congestion by making service by public transit
nearly impossible and creating or adding to jobs-housing imbalance,
through greater trip lengths.1"2 Parking requirements also lead to con-
gestion by increasing the relative convenience of automobile commuting.
Finally, mixed-use zoning13 is now commonly used to create the "inter-
nal capture" of trips originating from an on-site residence and ending at
an on-site non-residential building.
The numerical and geographical relationships between jobs and
housing have been addressed in some jurisdictions by using "point" sys-
100. STANDARD ZONING ENABLING AcT § 3 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Tent. Draft No. 1,
1968), reprinted in 5 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3D § 32.01, at 4-9 (1986).
101. See, e.g., LaSalle Natl Bank v. County of DuPage, 54 Ill. App. 3d 387, 394-95, 369
N.E.2d 505, 511 (1977) (important purpose of zoning is to alleviate traffic congestion); see also
6 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 34.02[2] (1990) ("[c]ontrol of traffic flow
is generally considered a legitimate concern ... of zoning laws"); Fonoroff, The Relationship of
Zoning to Traffic-Generators, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 238 (1955) (object of zoning ordi-
nance was to protect New York City from misplaced land uses and resulting traffic). But see
Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 357, 507 S.W.2d 101, 104 (1974) (traffic conges-
tion, although not in itself sufficient to justify zoning change, is important factor).
102. See Cervero, Jobs-Housing Balancing and Regional Mobility, 55 J. AM. PLAN. A. 136,
139 (1989). The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) predicted that
"[m]ost of the new jobs [in Southern California] between now and 2010 will locate in the
highly urbanized areas of Los Angeles and Orange counties, while most of the new housing
will be built in the urbanizing regions of Riverside, San Bernardino, and Southeast Orange
Counties." SOUTHERN CAL. ASS'N OF GOv'Ts, REGIONAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN
III-1 (1989). SCAG has identified jobs-housing performance goals for the region and sug-
gested implementation measures for local governments. These measures include transporta-
tion system management, siting employment-generating land uses near transportation
corridors and residential areas, and mixed-use zoning. Id. at VII-5.
103. Mixed-use zoning allows both residential and non-residential development to be in-
cluded within a unified development plan, reducing or eliminating the spatial separation be-
tween workers and employment destinations. See Cervero, supra note 102, at 145-46.
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tems during the development review process or by creating special
mixed-use districts."° A survey of development management techniques
in 260 jurisdictions found that approximately four percent of the respon-
dents used mechanisms designed to attain a numerical and/or geographic
balance between jobs and housing.105 Among the jobs-housing balance
strategies were the following: (1) building permit allocation systems or
other development review systems basing development approval on at-
taining a designated "point" score, with positive points awarded for
projects with favorable jobs-housing criteria, such as the creation of em-
ployee housing, and negative points assigned to those projects adding to
the jobs-housing imbalance; (2) "linkage" policies tying office or com-
mercial construction approval to the construction of new housing or pay-
ment of money into a housing trust fund; and, (3) mixed-use overlay
districts. 106
2. Subdivision approval
Local governments traditionally use subdivision approval to condi-
tion new development on the suitable design and location of internal
roadways. 10 7 Courts in most states permit the conditioning of subdivi-
sion approval and, more recently, site plan approval, for developments
not fitting within the conventional scope of subdivision regulations."' 8
These approvals often are based on the adequacy of off-site roadways to
accommodate the impact of the project, which may be enhanced by the
developers dedicating off-site roadway facilities or paying money in lieu
of dedication."°9 While subdivision approval may be denied due to the
104. Freilich, Stone, Leitner & Carlisle, Advice on Alternative Building Permit Allocation
Strategies 114-15 (Draft Interim Report Oct. 27, 1988) (submitted to City of Los Angeles,
Cal.) (unpublished report on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id at 114-15.
107. R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND COMMEN-
TARY 103-29 (1975); 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 101, § 45.02[4][a].
108. See, eg., Lindberg/Dahl Investors v. City of Garden Grove, 179 Cal. App. 3d 956,
963, 225 Cal. Rptr. 154, 158 (1986) (city council denied developer's site plan because private
streets within development were too long and narrow); Yamhill County v. Ludwick, 294 Or.
778, 789, 663 P.2d 398, 404 (1983) (county ordinance required existing legal lot of record as
prerequisite to granting conditional use permit); see also 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 101,
§§ 33C.01-33C.05 (describing authority, scope and rationale of site plan review).
109. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 1, at 363-97; R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra,
note 107, at 103 -29; see Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
636, 484 P.2d 606, 609, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (1971); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,
34 Cal. 2d 31, 34-35, 207 P.2d 1, 4 (1949); Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d
752, 753-54, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1977); Bethlehem Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 628 P.2d 668, 673 (Colo. 1981); City of Carbondale v.
Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831-32 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931
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inadequacy of roadway facilities, local governments must carefully struc-
ture mandatory dedications to demonstrate the nexus between the trans-
portation facilities and the impacts of the development.110
3. Flexible zoning, environmental review and developments of
regional impact
Implementing flexible zoning procedures permits local governments
to avoid the rigidity of the density and use standards of "as-of-right"
zoning by imposing conditions directly related to transportation goals
and policies. The earliest form of flexible zoning involved "contract"
111
or "conditional" '12 zoning, generally conducted on an ad-hoc basis. Spe-
cial use permits specify the conditions placed on particular uses, within
the terms of the zoning ordinance.1 13 A more recent form of flexible
zoning is the planned unit development. 1 4 An outgrowth of the ex-
panding role of bargaining within the development approval process is
the adoption of legislation authorizing local governments to enter into
(1980); Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 358, 369 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1977);
Land/Vest Properties v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 820, 379 A.2d 200, 202 (1977);
Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 588, 334 A.2d 30, 33 (1975); Robert Mueller
Assocs. v. Buffalo Township Bd. of Supervisors, 30 Pa. Commw. 386, 389, 373 A.2d 1173,
1174-75 (1977); cf Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 398, 271 N.E.2d 218, 219, 322
N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (1971) (county planning commission may deny subdivision plat approval
where project's location poses danger to nearby residents).
110. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Beaver Meadows
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985); Freilich & Morgan, supra note 23, at
169-75.
111. Contract zoning involves a rezoning pursuant to a contract between the local govern-
ment and the developer, whereby the developer agrees to subject his property to deed restric-
tions in exchange for the rezoning. Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling
Growth, 1974 INsT. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 147, 185.
112. Conditional zoning arises where the local government, without committing itself, ob-
tains a promise from the developer to dedicate property or to limit the use to which a property
will be put. Id. For a thorough treatment of the legal issues surrounding conditional and
contract zoning, see Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Develop-
ment Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L.
REV. 957 (1987).
113. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAw § 6.11, at 183 (2d ed. 1986). A special use permit is a permit required pursu-
ant to local zoning authority, whereby a designated use may be allowed subject to specified
conditions or criteria. Id. §§ 4.7-.9, at 83-88.
114. A planned unit development is a design concept allowing the flexible mixture of land
uses and use-to-use relationships on a single parcel pursuant to a site plan. Freilich, Awaken-
ing the Sleeping Giant New Trends and Developments in Environmental and Land Use Con-
trols, 1974 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 111, at 46.
June 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:915
development agreements providing for private infrastructure commit-
ments, in exchange for certain regulatory guarantees.115
Flexible zoning procedures allow local governments to review the
traffic impact of development proposals on a case-by-case basis. The ap-
proval of special use permits may be linked to the level of service (LOS)
on surrounding roadways, forming the basis for mitigative measures,
such as the dedication of facilities or transportation demand management
programs.116 As with subdivision controls, these conditions must be re-
lated to the impact of the project. Developers may be required to bear
the burden of reasonable public facility improvements only to the extent
that they are necessitated by the development.
1 1 7
Government bodies increasingly require special reviews of develop-
ments that generate substantial traffic because of their size or unique fea-
tures.118 For example, the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA)1 9 requires public agencies to prepare an environmental impact
report (EIR) to determine whether a proposed project creates a signifi-
cant environmental impact.1 20  Local governments may not approve
projects subject to CEQA unless feasible mitigation measures have been
produced.1 21 CEQA is not limited to public construction, but also ap-
115. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); Florida Local
Government Development Agreement Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220-.3243 (West 1990);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.0201-.0207 (Michie 1990); see also Taub, Development Agree-
ments, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1990, at 3, 3; Wegner, supra note 112, at 994-1027.
116. The ability to tailor mitigative conditions to specific development proposals is limited
in jurisdictions that apply a restrictive view of conditional zoning. In these jurisdictions, LOS
standards may be enforceable only through the denial of permit approval. See, e.g., Ghidorzi
Constr. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 80 N.C. App. 438, 440-41, 342 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1986) (up-
holding denial of special use permit because of inadequate traffic levels of service, despite fact
that future improvements would render LOS adequate); Rodriguez v. Prince George's County,
79 Md. App. 537, 553-54, 558 A.2d 742, 750, cert. denied, 566 A.2d 101 (1989) (invalidating
transportation demand management and development staging conditions attached to rezoning
proposal to implement adequate public facilities standards).
117. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828; Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 23 Ariz. App.
385, 390, 533 P.2d 693, 698 (1975); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412,
421-22, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 879-80 (1969); Cherry Hills Resort Dev. v. City of Cherry Hills
Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo. 1990); Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709
P.2d 928, 935 (Colo. 1985).
118. See, eg., Connecticut Council on Environmental Quality, Special Report: Recommen-
dations for Improving State Environmental Regulation of Large Traffic Generators 3 (Sept.
1990) (unpublished report on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
119. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
120. Id. §§ 21002.1, 21061, 21100, 21100.1; see M. REMY, T. THOMAS, S. DUGGAN & J.
MOOSE, GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AcT 2 (5th ed. 1991).
121. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.
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plies to the issuance of permits or other entitlements,'22 as well as to the
adoption or amendment of land use regulations and general plans.
123
Moreover, the EIR must address the environmental effect of public
or private projects that may stimulate growth, such as road construc-
tion. 24 Projects that will "cause an increase in traffic which is substan-
tial in relation to the existing traffic load and capacity of the street
system" are expected to significantly affect the environment. 2 - Conse-
quently, applications for development approval are often subject to
CEQA review because of their effect on nearby roadways. Mitigation
measures may include conditions limiting the development's size 12 6 or
intensity, as well as requiring the developer to rectify the project's
effect. 127
A similar approach for evaluating large-scale development proposals
is the development of regional impact (DRI) process. The DRI concept
is derived from the Model Land Development Code . 128 The DRI process
has been used extensively in Florida.129 Florida's DRI regulations re-
quire developments having an impact beyond the borders of the local
122. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 262, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1972).
123. OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL., CEQA: THE CALIFORNIA EN-
VIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT § 15378(a)(1) (1986) [hereinafter CEQA].
124. City of Antioch v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1325, 1338, 232 Cal. Rptr. 507, 515
(1986); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100(g).
125. CEQA, supra note 123, app. (G)(l). In Twain Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of
Tuolumne, 138 Cal. App. 3d 664, 188 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1982), a California court invalidated the
circulation element of a general plan and supporting environmental impact report (EIR) be-
cause it did not correlate with the land use element. Id. at 702, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 254. The
court's discussion illustrates the factors that must be considered when evaluating the relation-
ship between future land use and traffic congestion:
Ihe circulation element does not attempt to describe or discuss the changes or in-
creases in demands on the various roadways or transportation facilities of the County
as a result of changes in uses of land which will or may result from implementation
of the decision system [used as the criteria for the designation of land uses] and the
general plan. . . "The [EIR does] not address the important issues such as the
demographic center of the county, the population centers, the movement habits of
users or the traffic counts of the main roads and intersections."
Id. at 701, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (quoting letter from unnamed individuals to the County of
Tuolumne).
126. The ability to reduce the number of housing units in a development project is limited
somewhat by the effect of section 15041(c) of CEQA. See CEQA, supra note 123, § 15041(c).
Section 15041(c) prohibits the reduction of housing units as a mitigation measure or project
alternative if other mitigation measures or alternatives would have a comparable mitigative
effect. Id.
127. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002, 21081(a); CEQA, supra note 123, §§ 15002(a)(3),
15021(a)(2), 15091(a)(1).
128. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE §§ 7-301 to -305 (1976).
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West 1988).
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government to undergo a special review process involving state, regional
and/or local agencies.130
Florida has refined the DRI concept to account for the traffic de-
mands created by large-scale developments. Qualified developers may
prepare "areawide DRIs" that include a CIP and provisions for staging
development "contingent on availability of public facilities and serv-
ices."'' Florida requires mitigation measures when a DRI project ab-
sorbs a specified percentage of peak-hour traffic on regionally significant
roadways. 32 Mitigation measures may include the construction of road-
way links or intersections, payment of "proportionate share" fees, or pro-
ject phasing commensurate with the availability of public facilities and
services. 1
33
Special review requirements allow regional agencies to analyze the
impacts of projects having unusual effects on the roadway system because
of their large size. While this provides a useful mechanism for avoiding
sudden increases in traffic congestion, environmental or DRI review does
not address the cumulative effect of smaller projects that are often ex-
cluded from review. Therefore, environmental or DRI review should
supplement, rather than replace, other land use controls.
Flexible zoning procedures, negotiated exactions and special review
requirements give local governments the ability to address traffic conges-
tion through the regulatory approval process. It is imperative, however,
that the use of negotiated exactions flow from the principle that local
governments may deny development permits that would cause a decline
in established facility standards.134 Establishing a mechanism for deny-
ing regulatory approval sets the stage for imposing mitigating conditions.
In addition, by taking a firm stand on regulatory approvals, local govern-
ments evaluate the underlying standards governing such approvals in a
balanced manner. Clear standards mandate local governments to require
existing community residents to contribute to alleviating traffic conges-
tion through the elimination of deficiencies created by deferred capital
investments and rising automobile use. Adequate public facilities and
concurrency regulations provide a mechanism for linking transportation
planning, traffic congestion standards, public finance and regulatory ap-
provals to combat traffic congestion.
130. Id.
131. Id. § 380.06(25).
132. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 29F-3.011(8), 9J-2.0255(7) (1990).
133. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-2.0255 (state Division of Resource Planning
and Management requirements); id. r. 29F-3.01 18 (East Central Florida Regional Planning
Council requirements).
134. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
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B. Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances or "Concurrency"
Regulations: Linking Planning, Regulatory
and Fiscal Powers
Adequate public facilities ordinances (APFOs) tie land development
approvals to the ability of transportation facilities to serve new develop-
ment. Local governments should coordinate APFOs with a CIP process
in order to assure landowners that they will be able to develop their
projects within a reasonable period of time.13 APFOs are not intended
to serve as development moratoria, 136 but rather constitute timing and
sequencing devices. Specifically, they are long-term programs designed
to ensure that the pace of development does not surpass a local govern-
ment's ability to provide necessary public services and facilities.
137
APFOs represent a bifurcated technique, relying on a city's police pow-
ers to regulate the timing and sequency of development and its fiscal
powers to provide public services and facilities.13 1 Several states have
adopted enabling legislation authorizing local governments to adopt
APFOs.
139
135. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 380, 285 N.E.2d 291,
303, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 154, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
136. See D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 11, at 822 ("Moratoria are enacted under
the police power, as distinguished from zoning authority, on an emergency basis for the preser-
vation of the public health and safety such as inadequacy of sewer and water treatment facili-
ties which are posing an immediate threat to the environment."); see also Donohoe Constr. Co.
v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 1977) (sewer incapacity), cerL
denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Swanson v. Manin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 524,
128 Cal. Rptr. 485, 493 (1976) (threatened water shortage).
137. Freilich, supra note 111, at 161-62.
138. For a discussion of police and fiscal power functions in development management, see
MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, MARYLAND NAT'L CAPITAL PARK & PLANNING
COMM'N, PLANNING, STAGING AND REGULATING: FIFTH ANNUAL GROVWTH POLICY RE-
PORT 1-2 (1979).
139. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988) (authorizing enactment of ordi-
nances requiring planning, staging or provision of adequate public facilities); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 674:21-:22 (1986 & Supp. 1990) (authorizing timing and sequencing provisions where
city has adopted a CIP). Florida now mandates adequate public facilities through its concur-
rency requirement, forbidding the issuance of a land development permit that would cause
LOS standards to fall below those adopted in the Comprehensive Plan. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3202(2)(g) ('West 1990). The concurrency requirement demands that those facilities be
available concurrent with the impacts of the development, as measured by adopted LOS stan-
dards. Id. §§ 163.3177(10)(h), 163.3202(2)(g). Washington recently adopted similar legisla-
tion. Economic Development Act, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Laws 1375 (to be codified in scattered
sections of WASH. REV. CODE). Some older cases invalidated restrictive land use controls
premised on the future, cumulative demands on transportation systems. See, eg., National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 527, 215 A.2d 597, 609-10 (1965). The land-use
controls considered in National Land are distinguishable from modem techniques in that they
involved a large-lot zoning scheme and were not integrated with a CIP. See id. at 518, 215
A.2d at 605.
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1. Impact analysis and adequate public facilities
Development greatly impacts roadway links, intersections and pub-
lic transit facilities; consequently, a detailed "impact analysis" has be-
come an essential component of the land development review process. 14
Impact analysis does not necessarily refer to a particular type of land use
control, but rather to the method of evaluating a development's impact
on transportation facilities when considering whether to issue a land use
approval or determining the scope and extent of conditions and
mandatory dedications.1 4 1 Impact analysis is widely used in imposing
traffic mitigation requirements on a case-by-case basis.142
LOS standards are generally used to define the operational charac-
teristics of a roadway, intersection or transit system. They provide the
starting points for the development of an APFO. LOS is measured by
comparing the volume143 of traffic to the roadway system capacity. 14
Such standards may be used to evaluate the change in roadway perform-
ance resulting from single or incremental project proposals, or the aggre-
gate capacity of a transportation network on an areawide basis.
Roadway LOS analyses generally describe conditions such as "speed and
travel time, freedom to maneuver, traffic interruptions, comfort and con-
venience, and safety." The LOS is rated on a scale from "A" to "F,"
140. See, eg., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21100.1 (West 1986).
141. See, eg., Transportation Planners Council, Inst. of Transp. Eng'rs, Traffic Access and
Impact Studies for Site Development 1-2 (Sept. 1989) (draft of final unpublished report on file
at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
142. See Orski, Traffic Mitigation and Developers, URB. LAND, Mar. 1988, at 16. Traffic
engineers use several primary sources when evaluating the impact of new development on
roadways and intersections. See generally TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BD., NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, HIGHWAY CAPACITY MANUAL (1985) (delineating method by which road-
way performance is measured and classified, using LOS concept); INSTITUTE OF TRANSP.
ENG'RS, TRIP GENERATION (4th ed. 1987) (setting forth standard trip generation rates for
various types of land uses based on national averages, which may be modified based on local
conditions); INSTITUTE OF TRANsP. ENG'RS, TRANSP. RESEARCH CIRCULAR No. 212 (Jan.
1980) (describing intersection capacity utilization method for evaluating capacity of intersec-
tions); Taub & Bricklemeyer, Transportation Considerations, in 2 FLA ENVTL. & LAND USE L.
24-1 (1989).
143. Volume is defined as the "total number of vehicles that pass over a given point or
section of a lane or roadway during a given time interval." TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BD.,
HIGHWAY CAPACITY MANUAL 1-5 (1985).
144. "Capacity" is defined as "the maximum hourly rate at which persons or vehicles can
reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a lane or roadway during a
given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic, and control conditions." Id. at 1-3.
The Highway Capacity Manual also defines LOS in terms of speed and density. Speed is
"a rate of motion expressed as distance per unit [of] time." Id. at 1-4. Speed is generally
expressed in miles per hour, while density is expressed in vehicles per mile (vpm). Id. at 1-4.
Density is defined as the "number of vehicles occupying a given length of a lane or roadway,
averaged over time." Id. at 1-6.
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with "A" representing free-flow conditions and "F" representing forced
or breakdown conditions.14
2. Example: Montgomery County, Maryland APFO
Montgomery County enforces its APFO through the subdivision
process, imposing adequate public facilities requirements at the prelimi-
nary plan stage. 146 The county employs a two-tiered review system.
First, LOS standards are assigned within policy areas.14 A staging ceil-
ing is established for the policy area, based on the carrying capacity of
existing transportation facilities and those scheduled in the county and
state CIPs.148 A special ceiling allocation is established for affordable
housing. 149 The policy area LOS standards reflect the geographic cover-
age, route density, service frequency and accessibility of transit facilities,
as heavy congestion increases the likelihood that transit facilities will be
utilized.150
Second, "Local Area Transportation Review" is applied where:
(1) the project is above a certain threshold size; (2) the project is near a
congested intersection; or, (3) the policy area is within five percent of the
staging ceiling.' This level of review is required because some projects
could otherwise satisfy policy area review while causing local congestion.
3. Example: Proposed City of San Diego Transportation Congestion
Management and Development Phasing Ordinance
The City of San Diego recently considered an ordinance that estab-
lishes an annualized phasing limit, confining new development to the ca-
pacity of existing transportation facilities and new facilities included in a
145. Id. at 1-3 to 1-4.
146. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 50, § 50-35(k) (1973). For a discussion of
the Montgomery County APFO, see D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. MCBENNETT, B. VES-
TAL & D. HERR, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 309-27 (rev. ed.
1979); Christeller, Wresting with Growth in Montgomery County, Maryland, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT: KEEPING ON TARGET? 84 (D. Porter ed. 1986); Porter, Montgomery
County's Growth Fracas, URB. LAND, June 1982, at 34; Tierney, Maryland's Growing Pains:
The Need for State Regulation, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 201, 226-27 (1987).
147. Policy areas are aggregations of traffic zones based on their transportation characteris-
tics. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., FY 90 ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY 5 (July 27, 1989).
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id at 9.
150. Id. at 5, 25; MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, supra note 138, at 1-14.
151. MONTGOMERY COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, MARYLAND-NAT'L CAPITAL PARK AND
PLANNING COMM'N, LOCAL AREA TRANSPORTATION REVIEW GUIDELINES 1-3 (JULY 14,
1988).
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twenty-year CIP.152 The ordinance is designed to gradually alleviate
traffic congestion while avoiding a moratorium on development by using
realistic LOS standards. First, the LOS standards are achieved based
upon a capital facilities plan (CFP) covering a twenty-year horizon.153
Therefore, all growth need not be eliminated pending the attainment of
preferred levels of service, and some growth may occur while the city
plans for infrastructure. Second, the length of service is an average
LOS, 154 so the LOS does not have to be attained on every roadway link
and intersection. Requiring a preferred, uniform length of service on all
roadway intersections in most major urban areas would be unrealistic,
given travel behavior and environmental, fiscal and political limitations
on the city's ability to expand certain facilities.
The ordinance establishes an annualized development phasing limit
applicable throughout the city.155 A developer wishing to build sooner
than anticipated may either produce the facilities needed to avoid a dete-
rioration in the planned length of service or voluntarily advance a pay-
ment to cover the cost of the facilities. 56
To support the development phasing requirements and to correct
existing infrastructure deficiencies, a separate ordinance establishes a
CFP showing the capacity-adding roadway and transit facilities to be
made over a twenty-year period. 5 7 The CFP is categorized into facilities
needed to correct existing deficiencies and those needed to serve new
growth.1 58 The CFP ordinance specifically forbids the use of impact fees
or mandatory dedications as a source of funding for existing deficien-
cies. 15 9 Thus, the growth management plan uses a realistic, twenty-year
152. City of San Diego, Emergency Transportation Congestion Management and Develop-
ment Phasing Ordinance of 1990 § 5(A) (draft of July 5, 1990) (unpublished proposal on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (prepared by Freilich, Stone, Leitner & Carlisle) [herein-
after Congestion Management Ordinance].
153. City of San Diego, Emergency Capital Facilities Plan Ordinance of 1990, § I(Cf(2)
(draft of July 6, 1990) (unpublished proposal on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter CFP Ordinance].
154. See Congestion Management Ordinance, supra note 152, § l(B)(32).
155. An annualized phasing limit is the maximum number of average daily trips that may
be created by development throughout the city over a twenty-year period without exceeding
preferred LOS standards. Id § 5(A).
156. Id § 6.
157. See CFP Ordinance, supra note 153, § 1(C)(2).
158. Id. § l(D)(2)(a).
159. Id. § l(D)(2)(b). Several ordinances requiring the correction of existing LOS deficien-
cies as a condition of development approval have been stricken at the trial court level in Cali-
fornia on takings grounds. See McGavran v. City of Costa Mesa, No. 58-37-96 (Orange
County Super. Ct. June 7, 1989); Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, No. 57-74-
03 (Orange County Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 1989); Marblehead v. City of San Clemente, No. X-55-
11-82 (Orange County Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 91 Daily Journal
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horizon which recognizes that correcting infrastructure deficiencies and
creating the capacity needed to serve new growth involve time-consum-
ing processes.
4. Constitutional issues
APFOs must comply with constitutional limitations on the police
power imposed through the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution. In particular, landowners and developers
often claim that the delay in development approval is tantamount to a
temporary taking of property, requirmng compensation. This section de-
scribes the law in these areas and discusses how these issues may be
resolved.
a. the takings clause
APFOs may lead to takings claims in several distinct situations.
First, as with any restriction on development, the value of the project in
monetary terms may be reduced, especially for projects on the urban
fringe that may not be serviced for a long period of time. Additionally,
APFOs may interfere with the landowner's plans to build on the prop-
erty. Finally, classic versions of APEOs include an escape clause, al-
lowing developers to avoid a waiting period by constructing the
necessary facilities themselves." 6
A regulation, as opposed to a physical occupation 161 or an exaction
on development permission, constitutes a taking where "it imposes too
heavy a burden on property rights to be sustained as a police power regu-
lation." 62 A regulation requires compensation under the fifth amend-
ment when it (1) does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or (2) denies a landowner the economically viable use of his
DAR 1005 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1991), modified, 91 Daily Journal DAR 1475 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 31, 1991); Eggert, Traffic-Linked Growth Control in California, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q.
481, 486 (1989).
160. See, eg., Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Es-
cape clauses should be part of a program whereby development is phased in or denied on the
basis of the adequacy of public facilities, rather than an unlawful exaction requiring developers
to pay for existing facility deficiencies.
161. Regulatory takings must be distinguished from physical occupations, which are tak-
ings regardless of the legitimacy of the public purpose served. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
162. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 113, § 10.7. The classic statement of
this facet of the takings analysis is "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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property. 163 The first test balances the interests asserted by the govern-
ment against the regulation's economic impact. 164 This test determines
whether the government violated the policy of the takings clause-to
avoid the transfer of public burdens to a relatively small group of prop-
erty owners. 165 The second test focuses on whether the landowner has
been deprived of all reasonable use of the property.
166
The determination that a regulation amounts to a taking is essen-
tially a factual finding that the local government is attempting to avoid
the use of eminent domain powers through confiscatory regulation.1
67
When the regulation does not involve an outright transfer of property or
physical occupation, courts will examine (1) the nature of the govern-
ment's action, and (2) the "reciprocity of advantage" conferred by the
ordinance.' 68  The use of regulations to prevent injury to the health,
safety and welfare of the community exemplifies the distinction between
the police power and eminent domain power, regardless of the extent to
which the use or value of the property is impaired. Thus, the govern-
ment may demonstrate that temporary delays in development approval
are needed to prevent a public danger, such as the failure of a sewer
treatment plant 169 or the creation of flood-prone conditions due to inade-
quate drainage facilities. 170 The lesser the relationship between the re-
quired facilities and public health or safety, however, the greater is the
likelihood that the regulation will be invalidated.
The validity of an APFO under the second inquiry-whether a
landowner has been deprived of all reasonable use of his or her prop-
erty-is determined by considering the economic impact of the regula-
tion and the extent to which the landowner's "investment-backed
expectations" have been defeated.171 Mere fluctuations in value or the
163. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Estate of
Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wash. 2d 68, 78 n.1, 768 P.2d 462, 467 n.1 (1989).
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); see Freilich
& Chinn, Finetuning the Taking Equation: Applying It to Development Exactions, Part I, LAND
USE L., Feb. 1988, at 3, 9.
165. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
166. Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 136-37.
167. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 254 (1973).
168. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15; see also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 531 (1914). "Reciprocity of advantage" is used to describe the relationship between
the burdens and benefits of a regulation. "While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others." Key-
stone, 480 U.S. at 491.
169. See Estate of Scott v. Victoria County, 778 S.W.2d 585, 592 ('ex. Ct. App. 1989).
170. Sun Ridge Dev. v. City of Cheyenne, 787 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1990).
171. Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 124; Estate of Friedman, 112 Wash. 2d at 78-79, 768 P.2d at
467.
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loss of anticipated profits are not considered takings.17 2 To establish tak-
ings liability, the landowner must prove that all reasonable use of prop-
erty has been destroyed.'73 Courts have consistently upheld land use
regulations designed to thwart urban sprawl, despite enormous depriva-
tions in the economic value of the properties affected. 74
APFOs commonly allow developers to advance public facilities and
services to avoid delays occasioned by development phasing require-
ments."' Requiring a developer to provide all scheduled public im-
provements to rectify the existing LOS deficiencies may trigger a takings
challenge if the requirement is disproportionate to the development's im-
pact.'76 The question is whether the ordinance is truly designed to re-
lieve the harshness of a valid regulation, or whether the local government
is using its police powers to extort payments from the developer for ex-
isting deficiencies that will not be caused by the development. Where the
APFO is coupled with a realistic, financially feasible CIP, including
funding sources other than developer contributions, there is little doubt
that the ordinance is designed to achieve legitimate growth management
and public facilities goals. On the other hand, where a CIP is lacking, or
where mandatory dedications or impact fees represent the sole source of
capital improvements funding, the ordinance may not survive judicial
scrutiny.
In the aftermath of two United States Supreme Court takings cases,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 'I
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,'78 developers have increas-
ingly challenged the constitutionality of temporarily delaying develop-
ment approval to avoid public congestion.' 79 While First English and
Nollan both held that regulatory takings are subject to the fifth amend-
172. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1974); Moore v. City
of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990).
173. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498; see also Moore, 886 F.2d at 263.
174. See, e.g., Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (reduction in value from $2,000,000 to $100,000 not a
taking); Orsetti v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978) (upholding
open-space regulations causing reduction in value from $445,000 to $187,000); Brown v. City
of Fremont, 75 Cal. App. 3d 141, 142 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1977) (upholding open-space restrictions
causing reduction in value from $3.5 million to $675,000).
175. See, e.g., Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
176. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
177. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
178. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
179. See, e.g., Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 772-78 (1988) (arguing that tempo-
rary deferral of development approval is temporary taking).
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ment's compensation requirement,180 they did nothing to stultify the
range of public purposes recognized as sufficiently important to justify
substantial diminutions in property values without compensation.
In First English, the United States Supreme Court discussed
whether temporary bans on construction, such as moratoria and interim
development controls, may require compensation under the fifth amend-
ment."'1 The Court held that a landowner could receive compensation
for restrictions imposed by a flood plain development moratorium
adopted by the City of Los Angeles, provided that the landowner could
demonstrate that the restrictions amounted to a confiscatory taking.
18 2
The Supreme Court's decision did not address the issue of when a taking
occurs, but only discussed the appropriate remedy once takings liability
has been established. 3 The Court decided for the first time that com-
pensation may be awarded for a regulatory taking, even if the regulation
is subsequently repealed. 8 4 Under First English, if the restriction upon
180. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
181. First English, 482 U.S. at 306-07. Pre-1987 sewer moratoria and interim development
control cases upholding restraints on development for significant, but non-permanent periods
of time, have been held not to constitute a taking. For sewer moratoria cases, see Donohoe
Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 905 (1978); Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md.
1978); Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Dist., 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md.
1975); Candlestick Properties v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal.
App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 126
N.J. Super. 200, 313 A.2d 624 (1973), aff'd, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 336 A.2d 30 (1975); City of
Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). For interim development control
cases, see Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423
P.2d 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967); Collura v. Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. 881, 329 N.E.2d
733 (1975); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 245 N.W.2d 819 (1976); Rubin v.
McAlevey, 54 Misc. 2d 338, 282 N.Y.S.2d 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 29 A.D.2d 874,288
N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Term. 1968); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107
Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987). For a general discussion of interim development controls,
see Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexible Plan-
ning and Zoning, 49 J. URn. L. 65 (1971); Heeter, Interim Zoning Controls: Some Thoughts on
Their Uses & Abuses, in 2 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 35, at 411.
For post-1987 cases, see, eg., First English, 482 U.S. 304 (temporary moratorium denying
landowner of all uses would require compensation if in effect for an unreasonable period of
time); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (open-space moratorium
not a taking even if effective for an indefinite period); Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md. App.
96, 543 A.2d 863 (1988) (temporary zoning moratorium held not a taking); Estate of Scott, 778
S.W.2d at 585 (mere expectancy of sewer service, in absence of contract, not a property right;
thus temporary loss thereof held not a taking).
182. First English, 482 U.S. at 306-07.
183. Bozung & Alessi, Recent Developments in Environmental Presentation and the Rights
of Property Owners, 20 URn. LAW. 969, 1015 (1988); Roddewig, Recent Developments in Land
Use, Planning and Zoning Law, 22 URn. LAW. 719, 770 (1990).
184. Previous Supreme Court cases avoided the issue of whether the appropriate remedy for
a regulatory taking is compensation or simply invalidation of the ordinance. See Williamson
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the property is not permanent, a court will consider the remaining use
after the restriction terminates when determining the level of compensa-
tion due the landowner."8 5 The Court also stressed the importance of
distinguishing between the time during which a taking may have oc-
curred-from the date of enactment of the ordinance -- and the time
period considered to determine whether a taking has occurred in the first
place.
187
On remand, the California Court of Appeal found that the interim
ordinance prohibiting construction within the flood plain did not rise to
the level of a taking." The court made this finding despite the eight-
year period between the time of original adoption of the interim ordi-
nance and the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court.1 9
The court held that time is but one factor in the takings equation: "We
do not read the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in First English as con-
verting moratoriums and other interim land use restrictions into uncon-
stitutional 'temporary takings' requiring compensation unless, perhaps, if
these interim measures are unreasonable in purpose, duration or
scope."1 0 In the same vein, two commentators observed, "Even before
First English, a group of distinguished land-use lawyers and scholars had
warned that if the temporary regulatory theory espoused by Justice Bren-
nan in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. were adopted, then 'a way must be
found to avoid tossing development moratoria on the judicial ash
heap.' "191
The First English Court expressly recognized the validity of normal
delays in the development approval process. 92 Since First English, sev-
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199-200 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981); cf. Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979) (remedy for
regulatory taking is invalidation), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
185. See Bozung & Alessi, supra note 183, at 1014-30; Freilich, Solving the "Taking"Equa-
tion: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAw. 447, 477-80 (1983).
186. First English, 482 U.S. at 319-20.
187. Id. at 320.
188. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App.
3d 1353, 1374, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906-07 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990).
189. First English, 482 U.S. at 304-07.
190. First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1373, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
191. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 183, at 1014 (quoting Williams, Smith, Simon, Mandelker
& Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 193, 218 (1984) (citing San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)). But see Berger, The Supreme Court Lays Down the Law (Land Use Style), in 1989
ZONING & PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 197, 208-12 (M. Dennison ed.) (failing to distinguish
between temporary restraints on development and ordinances that amount to temporary
takings).
192. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
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eral courts have upheld moratoria involving such delays despite takings
claims.193 Thus, when a regulation is temporary, all reasonable use has
not been denied because future use remains.
194
For APFOs, the test is whether the regulation has left a reasonable
use over a reasonable period of time.195 The United States Supreme
Court identified this principle as the non-segmentation theory. This the-
ory provides that in determining whether a taking has occurred, the
property interest, both present and future, must be viewed in its en-
tirety. 196 As two commentators suggested:
Keystone and Penn Central require that present use and future
use be recognized solely as separate strands in the bundle of
rights that comprise property. Thus, the loss of the present use
strand, standing alone, does not constitute a facial taking. Even
if all present use is denied, there is no taking because future use
rights remain. When the time dimension in property is taken as
a whole, property rights are accorded their constitutional pro-
193. See, eg., Estate of Scott, 778 S.W.2d at 592 (moratorium on sewer operation permits
was reasonable, given developers' continual violation of permit requirements); Sun Ridge Dev.,
787 P.2d at 590 (37-day moratorium on sewer permits was reasonable, given developer's fail-
ure to comply with drainage regulations). See supra note 181 for a listing of post-First English
takings cases involving moratoria.
In fact, moratoria have been invalidated subsequent to First English only where expressly
designed to reduce the value of property in anticipation of condemnation, a practice which has
always been considered a taking. See Joint Ventures v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622
(Fla. 1990) (recordation of highway reservation map precluding issuance of building permits
held to be a taking of private property); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92,
109 n.9, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1067 n.9, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 550 n.9 (where property still profitable
and only two percent of local mining barred by statute, owners failed to demonstrate "any
deprivation significant enough" to constitute regulatory taking (citing Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493 (1987)).
194. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
195. First English, 482 U.S. at 318; Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 155; Freilich & Greis, supra note 60, at 71-73.
196. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501 (total prohibition of mining of coal in support estate not
a taking when entire mineral estate considered); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66 (restrictions on sale or
disposition of eagle feathers not a taking where property can still descend through inheri-
tance); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (no taking where regulation prohibited construction of
building in air space but allowed property owner to transfer development rights); Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (upholding zoning setback laws, despite total loss of setback
area); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (no taking of three
fingers of land where total restriction on development is required pursuant to federal wetlands
regulations and development of two fingers out of five is allowed), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017
(1982); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 335, 787 P.2d 907, 915 (par-
tial taking where regulation required buffer area of one-third of lot for open-space preserva-
tion) (overruling Allingham v. City of Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988)), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
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tection due if the landowner is given a reasonable use of prop-
erty measured over a reasonable period of time. 97
On remand, the court of appeal in First English found that the plain-
tiff failed to state a cause of action despite the outright prohibition of
construction on the property.1 98 The court's discussion of the balance
between public necessity and private deprivation is particularly relevant
to the issues raised by APFOs. First, the court distinguished the goal of
preventing premature urbanization-which was recognized as a signifi-
cant purpose in Agins v. City of Tiburon 19 9-- from the goal under consid-
eration in First English, which was the preservation of life and health.2'
The court then observed:
If there is a hierarchy of interests the police power serves-and
both logic and prior cases suggest there is-then the preserva-
tion of life must rank at the top. Zoning restrictions seldom
serve public interests so far up on the scale. More often these
laws guard against things like "premature urbanization," pre-
serve open spaces, or contribute to orderly development and
the mitigation of environmental impacts. When land use regu-
lations seek to advance what are deemed lesser interests such as
aesthetic values of the community they frequently are out-
weighed by constitutional property rights. Nonetheless, it
should be noted [that] even these lesser public interests have
been deemed sufficient to justify zoning which diminishes-
without compensation-the value of individual properties. 0 1
Thus, the goals of preserving life and health would support the depriva-
tion of all use of a landowner's property, while the goal of preventing
premature urbanization would not.
APFOs serve a number of purposes related to public health and
safety, as well as "minor" concerns related to urban design. Tying the
level of growth to the adequacy of water and sewer, transportation, fire
and school facilities promotes both the physical and psychological well-
being of the local inhabitants. Premature urbanization, which in Agins
was considered merely an aesthetic goal,2"2 is only one justification for
APFOs. Instead, an APFO is designed to preserve the ability of a com-
197. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 183, at 1017 (discussing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)).
198. First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1373-74, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 905-07.
199. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
200. First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1366, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
201. Id. at 1370, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (citations omitted).
202. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
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munity to provide public facilities and services essential to individual
health, safety and welfare, and to avoid congestion by maintaining a bal-
ance between development and infrastructure. Arguably, this multiplic-
ity of purposes should rank higher than the zoning restrictions
mentioned in First English.
b. the equal protection clause
Equal protection issues arise from public facilities requirements
where different standards are imposed on properties that are similarly
situated.2 "3 Thus, developers may raise equal protection claims when:
(1) different standards are imposed on different types of new develop-
ment; (2) different standards are imposed by geographic area; or, (3) dif-
ferent standards are imposed on existing and new residents. When cities
use "tier" systems, properties closer to the central city (in "urbanized"
areas) are subject to relatively lenient development standards, while
properties on the urban fringe (the "planned urbanizing" areas) are sub-
ject to adequate public facilities review.2"
In the context of land use regulation, courts sustain regulations as
long as they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose.0
Therefore, where studies establish the relationship of the APFO to or-
derly development and public health and welfare, equal protection chal-
lenges should not prove successful. Only where a local government
utterly fails to advance a legitimate basis for distinguishing between dif-
ferent classes of development will an equal protection challenge prevail,
especially where the APFO is based on exclusionary motives. For exam-
ple, in Begin v. Town of Sabattus,216 a Maine state court invalidated an
annual building permit limit for manufactured housing under a slow-
growth ordinance.20 7 The court found that limiting manufactured hous-
ing construction, but not other residential uses, was not rationally related
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
204. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of San Diego's "tier"
system.
205. Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269, 1276 (Me. 1979). Courts have recognized
that developers are not a suspect class meriting heightened scrutiny and that land development
is not a fundamental interest. See, eg., Candid Enters. v. Grossmont Union High School
Dist., 39 Cal. 3d 878, 890, 705 P.2d 876, 885, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303, 312 (1985); Russ Bldg.
Partnership v. City & County of San Francisco, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1507, 246 Cal. Rptr.
21, 26 (1987); Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170, 1173
(Colo. 1984).
206. 409 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1979).
207. Id. at 1276.
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to the purpose of slowing growth to alleviate traffic congestion and
strains on services. 2°'
Begin demonstrates that LOS standards should apply uniformly
within classes of development unless (1) the particular subclass of devel-
opment imposes a higher demand on public facilities and services than do
other types of development, or (2) a legitimate public purpose is offered
for imposing stricter or looser restrictions on a particular type of devel-
opment, and the variable restriction is rationally related to that
purpose.2 °9
c. the due process clause
Substantive due process requires that land use regulations further
the public health, safety and welfare.210 This is a two-tiered requirement.
First, the land use regulation must deal with a legitimate public pur-
pose.21' Second, the means selected to achieve that purpose must further
the purpose selected.21 2 The United States Supreme Court recognized
the legitimacy of growth control objectives in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas:
213
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor ve-
hicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs.... The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanc-
tuary for people.214
In the case of challenges to regulations or regulatory conditions not in-
volving a physical occupation or transfer of title to the government,
courts apply the rational basis test.215
208. Id.
209. For example, Montgomery County, Maryland, consistent with equal protection con-
straints, exempts low- and moderate-income projects from growth limits (based on adopted
LOS standards) to promote the legitimate public purpose of encouraging the development of
affordable housing. MONTGOMERY CouNTY, MD., supra note 147, at 9-10.
210. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
211. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88.
212. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9; Ybarra v. City of Los Altos, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir.
1974).
213. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
214. Id. at 9.
215. See, eg., Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 878 F.2d 1360 (11th
Cir. 1989) (property owner has no claim for just compensation through inverse condemnation
for injuries sustained by unreasonable zoning ordinance later declared invalid), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1132 (1990); Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
an "arbitrary and capricious" standard, court upheld 60-acre zoning scheme that was coupled
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Developers often assert right-to-travel challenges against growth
control regulation, alleging that local regulations which slow the rate of
growth interfere with citizens' abilities to relocate.216 Such claims are
usually rejected for lack of standing.2 17 If a developer avoids dismissal
for lack of standing and successfully claims interference with the right to
travel, the government must present a compelling government interest.218
Courts may also reject right-to-travel challenges by finding that the regu-
lation in question does not stop growth, but rather temporarily shifts the
growth to another location.21 9
Courts in some states have reformulated constitutional principles
into a regional general welfare standard. Such a standard requires com-
munities to consider the regional interests affected by growth control or-
dinances. 220 The regional general welfare standard requires a locality to
with development rights transfer provision designed to protect agricultural areas); Lemke v.
Cass County, 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1989) (decision must be so irrational as to bear no rela-
tionship whatsoever to merits of pending matter); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Es-
tates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988) (violation of state law, without more, is not denial of
substantive due process); Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.)
(lower court decision must be more than arbitrary or capricious; rather, it must be invidious or
irrational), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); ABN 51st St. Partners v. City of New York, 724
F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (legislative scheme implicit in law found to be rationally re-
lated to stated goals; court relied upon previous decision which found similar ordinances un-
constitutional for lack of foundation in "any thought or consideration whatsoever"). Compare
D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 113, § 10.7, at 324 (solution to taking puzzle
based on assumption that issue of remedy is separate from issue of taking claim) with Nollan,
483 U.S. at 841 (use of police power abridging property rights must substantially advance
legitimate state interest).
216. See, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (United States Constitution
does not explicitly protect right to travel). Growth management systems are rarely challenged
by those seeking entry into the community.
217. See, eg., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 904-05 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
218. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643 n.4.
219. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
220. See Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 604-08, 557 P.2d at 485-87, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 53-56; Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 208-
09, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983). Some states impose regional general welfare standards by statu-
tory direction addressing growth controls. See, e.g., CAL. EViD. CODE § 669.5 (West Supp.
1991) (creating presumption in land use litigation that numerical growth restrictions affect
regional housing needs); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302.8 (West 1983) (annual residential con-
struction limits imposed through general plan amendments must be accompanied by findings
regarding regional housing needs); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 674:22 (1986) (requiring consid-
eration of "regional development needs" prior to adoption of adequate public facilities ordi-
nance); see also Lesher Communications v. City of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 539 n.7, 802
P.2d 317, 321 n.7, 227 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 n.7 (1990) (statute establishing building moritorium to
prevent high traffic density was invalid due to its inconsistency with current development
plan); Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 817, 718 P.2d 68, 71, 226
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* consider the effect of an ordinance limiting intrajurisdictional population
growth on regional housing needs. It also requires the adjustment of de-
velopment controls so that community access by low- or moderate-in-
come persons is not impeded.22' This essentially requires a balancing test
between the benefits of growth controls and regional housing needs.222
Courts in states with strong regional general welfare standards have gen-
erally declined to hold development timing ordinances per se invalid.223
While commentators criticized APFOs for their potential exclusion-
ary effects,224 such criticisms were primarily directed at the earlier ordi-
nances.22 These ordinances often excluded residential developments
having a large impact on community facilities and services, but failed to
exclude commercial or office projects due to their positive impact on lo-
cal finances. In contrast, LOS controls restrict commercial, as well as
residential, development, thereby avoiding claims by excluded parties.
d. the good faith requirement
A municipality's transportation congestion management program
must be accompanied by good faith efforts to resolve existing deficiencies,
in addition to efforts to mitigate the externalities of new growth-related
impacts. Two essential rationales support this requirement. First, the
takings clause requires that new development can only be compelled to
mitigate its proportionate impact.2 26 In this way, new developments are
Cal. Rptr. 81, 84 (1986) (statute requiring local government to balance housing needs with
public service needs did not apply to ordinances adopted by initiative).
221. Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 607-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
55-56.
222. The courts have split on whether this is an appropriate inquiry. Compare, e.g., Win-
camp, 458 F. Supp. at 1026-27 (upholding refusal to expand capacity of sewage treatment
plant) with Urban League v. Mahwah Township, 207 N.J. Super. 169, 195-99, 504 A.2d 66,
79-81 (1984) (rejecting planning expert's testimony that preservation of "community charac-
ter" justified postponement of phasing in community's fair share obligations). Where existing
land use regulations adequately accommodate regional housing needs, however, it has been
held that cities may adopt restrictive land use regulations, provided they do not preclude the
accommodation of those needs. See, eg., DeCaro v. Washington Township, 21 Pa. Commw.
252, 257-58, 344 A.2d 725, 728-29 (1975).
223. See Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 557 P.2d at 482-83, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 52-53; Southern Burlington, 67 N.J. at 188 n.20, 336 A.2d at 732 n.20.
224. See, e.g., Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law To Bind the Rights of the
Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234, 247-50 (1973).
225. See NATIONAL COMM'N, supra note 10, at 212-13 (criticizing fiscal zoning).
226. Paradyne Corp. v. State Dep't of Transp., 528 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 727, 750 P.2d 651, 653 (1988). Justice
Scalia, dissenting in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), elaborated on the "nexus"
requirement set forth in his majority opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987). Observing that the fifth amendment's takings clause bars government from
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not burdened for ills not of their making. Second, without an even-
handed approach to apportioning infrastructure shortfalls between ex-
isting residents and new development, courts may search for an im-
proper, ulterior motive.227
Courts have consistently upheld growth controls imposed pursuant
to a balanced and even-handed comprehensive plan designed to resolve
infrastructure deficiencies.228 When a comprehensive plan is not in
place, but studies to develop such a plan are under way, courts presume a
good faith effort.229 Such studies also defeat allegations of hidden illegal
motives to deter growth.23 °
These principles are illustrated by a series of New York cases, hold-
ing that new development can be denied pending resolution of deficien-
forcing certain parties to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public at large, Justice Scalia noted:
Traditional land-use regulation (short of that which totally destroys the economic
value of property) does not violate this principle because there is a cause-and-effect
relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil
that the regulation seeks to remedy. Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but
for the regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that
he has been singled out unfairly. Thus, the common zoning regulations requiring
subdividers to observe lot-size and set-back restrictions, and to deduct certain areas
to public streets, are in accord with our constitutional traditions because the pro-
posed property use would otherwise be the cause of excessive congestion.
Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See 303 W. 42nd Street Corp. v. Klein, 58 A.D.2d 778, 396 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1977). In
303 W. 42nd Street, the Mayor of the City of New York "declared war" on businesses exploit-
ing sexually oriented material. Id at 779, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88. To further these efforts,
the Buildings Department required that the plaintiff expand the existing sprinkler system to
cover all floors in the building. Id at 778, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 386. In a bitter dissent, Judge
Silverman questioned whether New York was using the public safety rationale to eliminate a
legitimate-although politically unpopular-use. Id at 778-80, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87
(Silverman, 3., dissenting). California courts often scrutinize development restrictions for ille-
gal exclusionary purposes. See, eg., Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41.
228. See Golden, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (town adopted 18-year
capital improvement program demonstrating where capital facilities to deal both with new
growth and deficiencies would be located); Matter of Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106
N.E.2d 503 (1952).
229. See, eg., Conway v. Town of Stratham, 120 N.H. 257, 259, 414 A.2d 539, 540-41
(1980) (slow growth ordinance limiting number of lots that may be approved by town's plan-
ning board upheld); Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 801, 394 A.2d 847, 852 (1978)
(good faith efforts to increase capacity of municipal services accompanying growth controls).
230. In Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1978),
the court rejected a substantive due process challenge. In doing so, the court noted the
county's comprehensive planning efforts. Id. at 1029. The county had appropriated substan-
tial sums of money towards other wastewater treatment plants in the current budget and insti-
tuted a $100 million "capital facilities program" for wastewater treatment. Id. at 1026-27.
The Wincamp court noted that "the comprehensive plans to improve wastewater facilities
belied any hidden purpose to hinder growth." Id. at 1027 (citing Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975)).
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cies if the city demonstrates good faith efforts to address those
deficiencies.2 ' Such a denial is permitted notwithstanding constitutional
restrictions on development controls requiring new construction to pay
for existing deficiencies.2" 2 Denial of new development, however, is an
unconstitutional taking if the city has not taken good faith steps to pro-
vide an adequate system.233 Denial would likewise constitute a taking if
the ban was not adopted pursuant to a comprehensive plan.234
5. Evaluation of APFOs
APFOs enjoy many advantages over their traditional counterparts
and other innovative land use controls. APFOs directly control the level
of population and employment growth, which represent a major source
of roadway demand. Construction is prohibited unless it can be accom-
modated within the capacity of existing and planned public facilities.
Once a development is approved or denied, no additional oversight is
needed.235
An APFO integrates a local government's police and fiscal powers
in order to address traffic congestion. Under an APFO, the government
can deny new development if roadway or transit LOS standards will not
231. E.g., Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697, 364
N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974); Golden, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138; Westwood
Forest Estates v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1969); accord Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985)
(county could deny Planned Unit Development approval for lack of adequate off-site road
capacity but could not apportion cost of building facilities disproportionately to developer).
232. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
233. See Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977)
(denying landowners permission to tie into city sewer system held unconstitutional taking).
234. See Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331 (D.R.I. 1986) (invalidating morato-
rium pending the resolution of sewer system inadequacies), aff'd, 836 F.2d 1340 (1st Cir.
1987); Westwood Forest Estates, 23 N.Y.2d at 427, 244 N.E.2d at 701-02, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 132
(invalidating outright ban on multi-family construction that had been imposed to alleviate
burden on city's sewage disposal plant, where plant had capacity and problem predated advent
of new construction). Noting that the sewer system expansion had occurred in a piece-meal
fashion, rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan, the Q. C. Construction court required
"measurable" efforts to improve the system. Q.C. Constr., 649 F. Supp. at 1335-36 (citing
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)). The court cited a number of other
cases approving development restrictions or moratoria imposed under a comprehensive plan to
remedy deficiencies and which would not impose a permanent ban on development. Id at
1337-38 (citing Schaffer v. City of New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1984); Wincamp
Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1976); Smoke Rise, Inc. v.
Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975); Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972)).
235. This is in contrast to TDM ordinances, which introduce enforcement and administra-
tive difficulties not presented by APFOs. See infra text accompanying note 280.
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adequately serve the anticipated increase in population. APFOs also es-
tablish ascertainable criteria against which new development will be re-
viewed. Accordingly, APFOs can serve as the springboard for other
innovative land use controls, such as TDM ordinances, transfer of devel-
opment rights, negotiated exactions and impact fees. In addition,
APFOs may be used to integrate transportation goals with other compre-
hensive planning goals relating to urban development patterns and af-
fordable housing.
APFOs recognize that new development is not solely responsible for
traffic congestion. The national increase in automobile use and delays in
needed capital investments contribute to congestion even in the absence
of new growth. CIPs add the capacity needed to address existing conges-
tion problems by using timing and sequencing controls to ensure that
new development does not disrupt the balance between roadway supply
and demand. APFOs, however, have been criticized by commentators
concerned about the effect of growth management on urban decentraliza-
tion, housing and property rights. The following sections examine the
arguments commonly raised against APFOs.
a. effect on traffic congestion
Some commentators argue that strict growth limits merely force de-
velopment pressures outside the enacting jurisdiction, thereby exacerbat-
ing the traffic congestion by increasing the spatial separation between
jobs and housing. This situation allegedly exacerbates the congestion
problem that the concurrency standard was intended to resolve.236 For
several reasons, these concerns do not affect the reasonableness of an
APFO per se. First, while the objection is commonly raised at public
hearings, commentators generally direct it toward moratoria rather than
APFOs.23' Second, adequate public facility requirements bear no less of
a relationship to the alleviation of traffic congestion than the traditional
large-lot zoning requirements which have been accorded enormous judi-
cial deference. The fact that concurrency is innovative does not make it
less effective.
Third, it is pure speculation to assert that a developer will relocate
simply because a timing and sequencing mechanism is imposed. Traffic
is indicative of a jurisdiction's relative attractiveness for real estate devel-
opment, and many site location decisions are based on increased traffic
236. See infra note 237.
237. See, e.g., D. CURTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND-USE AND PLANNING LAw 242 (1lth ed.
1991); Cervero, supra note 5, at 403-04 (discussing Walnut Creek's LOS-based moratorium);
Note, Traffic-Linked Growth Control in California, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 496-97 (1989).
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demands. Outlying jurisdictions often lack the agglomeration economies
that render urban-scale development possible.238 For a developer to
build elsewhere suggests that he or she traded the decision to build on a
more marketable tract of land for a decision to build at an earlier time.
With the time commitment required to secure financing and other gov-
ernmental approvals, developers could potentially use the delay to their
advantage. This argument implies that developers always equate innova-
tive land use regulations with restrictive land use regulations. In reality,
developers realize that timing and sequencing mechanisms are no more
restrictive than the traditional land use controls normally applied to
combat traffic congestion. Timing and sequencing mechanisms can be,
and often are, coupled with less restrictive underlying zoning schemes.
Fourth, in some jurisdictions, especially those heavily beset by traf-
fic, there are no other places to build. Land absorption and the growth
management programs of other outlying jurisdictions may preclude such
alternative sites. In addition, such jurisdictions may not have the public
facilities and services or complementary businesses to render a project
buildable or marketable.
Fifth, an APFO may be structured to eliminate potential effects on
trip length. Many ordinances apply only to residential or non-residential
growth. Assuming that developments affected by an APFO could eco-
nomically locate beyond the offending jurisdiction and that the alterna-
tive location is feasible, applying restrictive controls could add to a jobs-
housing imbalance. Such an imbalance further extends trip lengths and
exacerbates traffic congestion. Assuming that developers would relocate
outside the jurisdiction in response to an APFO, if both jobs and housing
are restricted in an even-handed manner-as in Montgomery County
and the proposed San Diego program-both jobs and housing would
relocate elsewhere.239 Such relocations would maintain a balance be-
tween trip origins and trip destinations.2" In Montgomery County, the
development phasing limits are established separately for jobs and hous-
ing in order to maintain an appropriate balance.24
Some jurisdictions, such as Montgomery County, adopt lower levels
of service in areas close to the urban core, where traffic congestion is
238. This point is conceded by one economist, who argues that restrictive zoning contrib-
utes to decentralization. W. FiSCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 270 (1985).
239. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
240. Chinitz, Growth Management Good for the Town, Bad for the Nation?, 56 J. AM.
PLAN. A. 3, 7 (1990).
241. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. supra note 147, at 6.
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heaviest, or where public transportation is available.242 This is consistent
with other comprehensive planning goals and reflects consumer expecta-
tions. Other jurisdictions may exempt affordable housing to correct jobs-
housing imbalances.
b. effect of concurrency regulations on housing
The abundance of low-cost land on the urban fringe, combined with
the scarcity of affordable housing in urbanized areas, has contributed to
urban decentralization. In Southern California, this situation has forced
many commuters to travel for up to two hours in each direction for
home-to-work trips.243 Growth limits and restrictive development con-
trols are commonly blamed for contributing to rising housing costs.
244
Instead of using growth controls to exclude low- or moderate-income
families, local governments can establish exemptions or preferential
treatment for qualified affordable housing projects to create an incentive
for development. 245 A recent study of California cities found no signifi-
cant relationship between housing prices in communities with growth
management programs and those without such programs.246
Several state courts, including the California Supreme Court, have
determined that municipal land use regulations must be reasonably re-
lated to the welfare of the region, including the accommodation of re-
gional housing needs.247 In California, courts analyze: (1) the effect and
242. See Christeller, supra note 146, at 84.
243. Fulton, The Long Commute, PLANNING, July 1990, at 4, 4.
244. Section 105(b)(4) of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act requires
local governments to identify the effect of land use controls and growth limits on housing and
to develop strategies "to remove or ameliorate" the effect of those policies on affordable hous-
ing, as a condition to receiving direct federal assistance for housing. Cranston-Gonzalez Na-
tional Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 105(b)(4), 104 Stat. 4079, 4089 (1990).
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, however, cannot use the "adoption or
continuation" of restrictive land use policies as grounds for the denial of housing assistance.
Id § 105(c)(l).
245. See White, Development Fees and Exemptions for Affordable Housing: Tailoring Regu-
lations to Achieve Multiple Public Objectives, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 25, 51-52 (1990).
246. Glickfeld & Levine, supra note 5, at 36, 39; see also Studies Refute Cliches About
Growth Control, CAL. PLAN. DEV. REP., Sept. 1990, at 1, 3 (survey of more than 500 Califor-
nia cities and counties found little relationship between community wealth and likelihood of
growth control). The Florida Department of Community Affairs encourages local govern-
ments to reserve capacity or to adopt preferential concurrency standards for affordable hous-
ing projects when developing an APFO. Strategies to Address Affordable Housing Needs,
TECHNICAL MEMO, Oct. 1990, at 16, 19.
247. See, eg., Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 589, 557 P.2d at 476, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 44; see supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 669.5 (West
Supp. 1991) (shifting burden of proof on local governments to justify growth numeric
controls).
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duration of the restriction; (2) the competing interests affected by the
restriction; and, (3) whether the ordinance represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of those interests.
248
Because APFOs are tied to CIPs designed to expand the capacity of
public facilities, their goal is to accommodate, rather than to impede,
growth and development. In Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore,249 the California Supreme Court considered a local morato-
rium that was to remain effective pending the resolution of LOS deficien-
cies for schools, sewer treatment and water facilities.250  The court
upheld the ordinance, distinguishing large-lot zoning ordinances, which
"impede the ability of low or moderate income persons to immigrate to a
community but permit largely unimpeded entry by wealthier persons,"
from growth rate mechanisms tied to the availability of public facili-
ties.2 1  APFOs would satisfy even the most restrictive regional general
welfare tests, if coupled with a realistic, financially feasible CIP.
c. adequate public facilities ordinances distinguished from moratoria
A common response to the traffic congestion problem in California
has been the use of moratoria prohibiting all development pending the
resolution of LOS deficiencies. 252 The flaw in this approach is the failure
to couple land use regulations with structural and fiscal measures to in-
crease facility capacity. Because new growth represents only one varia-
ble in the traffic congestion equation, withholding development approvals
will not solve the traffic congestion problem absent complementary struc-
tural and fiscal measures. Instead, traffic will continue to increase due to
rising automobile use by existing residents. Additionally, if a developer
faces a permanent ban on development rather than a delay, development
pressures could indeed be forced beyond the jurisdiction.
Moratoria can be a useful planning device when carefully limited in
duration and coupled with diligent efforts to resolve the problems leading
to their adoption.253 Several states prohibit moratoria absent a showing
248. Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
56-57.
249. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
250. Id. at 590, 557 P.2d at 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
251. Id. at 606, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55. In his dissent, Justice Mosk noted
that the Livermore ordinance lacked a CIP, "provid[ing] no timetable or dates by which the
public services are to be made adequate." Id. at 616, 557 P.2d at 493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Consequently, Justice Mosk would have invalidated the ordinance as
exclusionary. See id. at 623, 557 P.2d at 497, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 590, 557 P.2d at 476, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 44; Eggert, supra note 159, at 496-97.
253. Freilich, supra note 11, at 151-57; Freilich, Interim Development Controls---For Flexi-
ble Planning/Zoning, in 2 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 35, at 401-02.
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of a compelling need, because they are frequently misused.25 4 Oregon
recognizes that moratoria carefully limited in duration may be desirable
if coupled with comprehensive growth management systems that con-
sider state and local comprehensive goals.255
C. Transportation Demand Management Ordinances
Transportation demand management (TDM) ordinances seek to
minimize the adverse impact of development on traffic. They frequently
encompass non-residential development only. Most TDM ordinances
apply to all employers-new or existing-and may be enforced against
new development through the subdivision process. Mandatory TDM or-
dinances are, in part, an outgrowth of the increasing use of transporta-
tion management associations by private businesses promoting traffic
mitigation programs.25 6
Most TDM measures spread traffic throughout the day with stag-
gered work houts and flex-time requirements. TDM programs rely on
ridesharing, parking management and other measures to reduce the
number of trips generated and to limit when those trips occur. 2 7 Devel-
opers and existing employers are often required to implement various
types of measures to alleviate traffic congestion. 25 8 These measures
include:
1. Staggered work hours, thereby reducing traffic during the
peak hours;
2. Ridesharing alternatives, such as carpooling or vanpooling;
3. Facilitating use of alternative transportation modes, such
as bicycles;
4. Parking management;
5. Park and ride lots; and,
254. See, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-28 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 197.505-.540 (1985); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 669.5 (West Supp. 1991) (placing burden
of proof on local governments to justify numeric growth controls).
255. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.510(2).
256. R. DUNPHY & B. LIN, TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS
43-66 (1990); Orski, Transportation Management Associations: Battling Suburban Congestion,
URE. LAND, Dec. 1986, at 3.
257. See Ferguson, Transportation Demand Management: Planning, Development, and Im-
plementation, 56 J. AM. PLAN. A. 442,447-48 (1990); Kozlak, supra note 54, at 230-31. For a
discussion of how TDM ordinances are structured and implemented, see generally GREATER
PRINCETON TRANSP. MGMT. ASS'N, TRAFIC MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES: A PLANNING
GUIDE (1989).
258. See generally GREATER PRINCETON TRANSP. MANAGEMENT ASS'N, supra note 257.
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6. Transportation Management Organizations, which "pro-
vide and promote transportation services and... imple-
ment various travel demand management services."
259
Pleasanton, California, a suburb of San Francisco, adopted the na-
tion's first TDM ordinance.2 ° The ordinance requires all employers
with ten or more employees to implement a TDM information pro-
gram.26 ' The information is submitted to the city transportation coordi-
nator.262 All employers with more than fifty employees are required to
implement a TDM program applying a combination of TDM measures,
such as transit-related programs, ridesharing, non-vehicular commute
modes, and staggered workhour programs.263 The ordinance aims for a
forty-five percent reduction in peak-hour single-occupant vehicle trips
per complex.26" Finally, the city council may impose fines for non-com-
pliance, and expend revenues from such fines on traffic-related
improvements.265
Montgomery County, Maryland combines TDMs with a develop-
ment staging approach. For example, in the Silver Spring redevelopment
area, the county established a special staging ceiling, which relies on
TDM measures to facilitate its commuting goals.266 An advisory com-
mittee is appointed to administer the program.267 New development
projects and employers with more than twenty-five employees must sub-
mit a traffic mitigation plan.268 As a condition of subdivision approval
pursuant to the APFO, the employer must submit a traffic mitigation
plan, including a transportation coordinator, parking space limitations,
participation in the construction of off-site transportation facilities,
carpools, vanpools, subsidized transit passes, preferential parking or
peak-hour parking charges.269 The program combines incentives270 with
preferential treatment for carpoolers and vanpoolersY7
259. Kozlak, supra note 54, at 231.
260. Pleasanton, Cal., Ordinance 1154 (Aug. 20, 1984).
261. Pleasanton, Cal., Ordinance 1154, § 17.24.050(A) (Nov. 1990).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 17.24.060.
264. Id. § 17.24.120.
265. Id. § 17.24.150.
266. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 42A-10 to -20 (1988).
267. Id. § 42A-13. The voting members of this committee are all business representatives.
268. Id. § 42A-15.
269. Id §§ 42A-16(a)-(b).
270. Incentives take the form of subsidized alternatives to auto travel, such as transit and
bus passes and taxi vouchers. Id § 42A-16(b)(5).
271. Id. § 42A-16(b)(4).
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In 1990, Arizona enacted a mandatory travel reduction program 72
applicable to counties with populations exceeding 1.2 million people.2
The program applies only to the major employers.274 Major employers
must: (1) provide information to employees on alternative travel modes
and trip reduction measures; (2) participate in reporting and monitoring
efforts with a county task force; and, (3) prepare and implement a travel
reduction plan. 27  Like the Montgomery County measures, Arizona's
traffic reduction measures include commuter matching services, subsidies
and incentives for vanpooling and carpooling, cooperation with transpor-
tation providers to provide bus services, subsidized bus fares, adjusted
work hours and provisions for walking and bicycling.
276
Additionally, the Arizona program's goal for employers includes a
five percent reduction of commuting single-occupant vehicles by the end
of the first year, and an additional five percent reduction in the second
year.2 7 7 Civil penalties may be imposed on an employer for failure to
adopt the required implementation measure or to achieve the travel re-
duction goals.2 78 If the employer "is attempting in good faith to meet the
goals," failure to meet the goals does not constitute a violation.2 9
Because TDM requirements impose continuous obligations on de-
velopers, they present enforcement and administration problems not
present in traditional land use regulations. For example, Seattle's TDM
requirements, imposed as a condition of environmental review, 2 10 have
proven ineffective due to enforcement difficulties.281 Enforcement mech-
anisms generally include the withholding of certificates of occupancy or
fines. Withholding certificates of occupancy, however, has limited im-
pact because it is difficult to monitor compliance before a project is occu-
272. Travel Reduction Program, ch. 362, 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1596 (codified at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-581 to -593 (Supp. 1990)).
273. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-582 (Supp. 1990).
274. Id. § 49-581(10). Major employers are defined as employers that employ "one hun-
dred or more employees working at or reporting to a single work site during any twenty-four
hour period for at least six months during the year." Id.
275. Id. § 49-588. The travel reduction plan must include a transportation coordinator,
employee information programs and travel reduction measures. Id
276. Id § 49-588(A)(3).
277. Id § 49-588(D).
278. Id § 49-593(B).
279. Id. § 49-593(C).
280. Washington State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§
.21C.010-.21C.914 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
281. Cf McCutcheon & Harem, Land Use Regulations to Promote Ridesharing: An Evalu-
ation of the Seattle Approach, 11 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 143, 152-53 (1984) (since ridesharing
measures cannot be evaluated until building is completed and occupied, they present "greater
opportunity for violation and fewer avenues of enforcement").
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pied. Furthermore, assessing and collecting fines after project approval is
expensive and cumbersome. Instead, prcject approval should be directly
tied to the traffic demand created by the development, as in an APFO.
Such a standard would encourage developers to initiate realistic and per-
manent traffic control measures.282
D. Transfer of Development Rights
Transferable development rights (TDRs) are most commonly used
to preserve historic resources,28 3 protect environmentally sensitive
lands284 and guard agricultural areas.215 In addition, TDRs have also
been successfully applied to facilitate traffic mitigation strategies. TDRs
involve the transfer of development rights from "sending" or "control"
zones, with restrictive land use controls, to designated "receiving" or
"development" zones located at nodes along transportation corridors.28 6
This transfer compensates the property owner for the property value loss
resulting from restrictive growth regulations. 2 7  Transfers of develop-
ment rights have been successfully used to implement growth controls,
such as density caps, in order to alleviate traffic congestion.288
E. Transportation Impact Fees
Impact fees represent an innovative approach to land use regulation.
Such fees are founded on the principle that those creating the need for
and benefiting from new facilities should pay for the facilities. Financing
approaches utilizing private sector resources are also encouraged.28 9 In
282. R. DUNPHY & B. LIN, supra note 256, at 99 (implementation of TDM measures pursu-
ant to APFO in order to mitigate impact of development in surrounding roadways).
283. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1978).
284. See, e.g., Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(transfer development rights sufficient to protect sensitive wetlands, upland habitat, hammock
and active use zones). But see Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538, 720 P.2d 513
(1986) (restrictions on only hilly terrain within city limits held unconstitutional taking).
285. West Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 309 Md. 183, 522 A.2d 1328 (1987) (involving county zoning ordinance to preserve
open space and agricultural area).
286. See Freilich & Chinn, supra note 1, at 166.
287. TDRs often safeguard restrictive regulatory schemes from challenges that all reason-
able use has been taken under the fifth amendment. See Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 137; Glisson,
558 So. 2d at 1035-38.
288. See also City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (transfer of development rights within large oceanfront property to limit traffic density
not a taking). See generally Freilich & Senville, Takings, TDRs, and Environmental Preserva-
tion: "Fairness" and the Hollywood North Beach Case, LAND UsE L. & ZONING DIG., Sept.
1983, at 4 (discussing that TDR concept used to avoid finding that restrictive land use regula-
tions results in unconstitutional taking of private property).
289. See Freilich & Nichols, supra note 96, at 6-7.
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addition, the Bush Administration recently proposed major changes to
federal highway legislation that would "require major cities to establish
detailed transportation improvement programs addressing land use, mass
transit and congestion. ' 290 Such programs would receive partial federal
funding and broaden the use of innovative traffic congestion solutions
which do not rely on highway construction.
In many states, enabling legislation authorizes impact fees for roads
and traffic signalization.291 Some states do not expressly limit the types
of capital facility costs recoverable through impact fees.292 Section
66484.3 of the California Government Code293 delegates tO Orange
County cities the authority to impose impact fees for major thorough-
fares.2 94 Impact fees raise several legal issues, including constitutional
nexus requirements295 and, at the state court level, whether or not the
authority to impose impact fees is explicitly or impliedly included in the
state impact fees enabling legislation.296
290. Cushman, U.S. Plans a Shift on Road Spending, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1990, at Al,
col. 1.
291. See, eg., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1102(A) (Supp. 1990) (development fees); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 66002(c)(6) (West Supp. 1991) (capital improvement plan); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-45 to -4513 (Supp. 1990) (development impact fees); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-
904 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (transportation impact fees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§ 4961-A(3) (1989) (impact fees); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to -498.10 (1989) (road im-
pact fees); WASH. R v. CODE §§ 39.92.010-.92.901 (Supp. 1991) (impact fees).
292. See, eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5201(2)
(Supp. 1990); see also Morgan, Recent Developments in the Law of Impact Fees with Special
Attention to Legislation, in 1990 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.01,
§ 4.04[2][d] (noting broad enabling statutes that define public facilities or capital
improvements).
293. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66484.3 (West Supp. 1991).
294. Ia
295. See D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNETr, B. VESTAL & D. HERR, supra
note 146, at 53-64.
296. State courts are divided on the issue of whether or not explicit enabling legislation is
required for the enactment of local impact fees. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board
of County Comm'r, 446 So. 2d 140, 142-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (since there is no specific
limitation in state constitution, county may enact impact fee without explicit enabling legisla-
tion). But see Eastern Diversified Properties v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45, 48-52, 570
A.2d 850, 853-55 (1990) (impact fee is tax which county had no authority to impose, as gen-
eral taxing power is reserved to states); New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Bernards Township, 108
N.J. 223, 233, 528 A.2d 555, 562 (1987) (township cannot allocate cost of road improvement
plan on basis of anticipated impact without enabling legislation); Albany Area Builders Ass'n
v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 376-79, 546 N.E.2d 920, 921-23, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627,
628-30 (1989) (state legislature enacted comprehensive scheme for highway funding and
thereby preempted town law requiring use of impact fees).
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V. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING FOR TRAFFIC CONGESTION:
EMERGING STATE AND REGIONAL APPROACHES
The seriousness and complexity of the traffic congestion problem in
urban areas demands that cities use all structural, financial and regula-
tory tools at their disposal. Cities cannot solve, nor escape from, traffic
congestion problems by simply placing the entire responsibility with
transportation engineers, taxpayers or the development industry. The
only effective solution will be found in comprehensive planning schemes.
This section explores how some states require and authorize local gov-
ernments to apply comprehensive planning to mitigate traffic congestion.
A. California
The California legislature recently adopted a far-reaching transpor-
tation planning statute297 which was buttressed by a voter-approved
comprehensive transportation funding package.2 98 Designated county
agencies are required to prepare congestion management programs
(CMPs) for every city within the county.2 99 Each CMP must include:
(1) minimum traffic level of service standards; (2) a trip reduction and
travel demand element; (3) transit standards; (4) a program for analyz-
ing the impact of land use decisions on traffic LOS; and, (5) a seven-year
regional transportation improvement program.3°° This revolutionary re-
structuring of the land use approval and transportation financing process
may signal a trend toward comprehensive solutions in other states.
At the local government level, the statute requires a traffic circula-
tion element in all local government general plans.301 The circulation
element must be coordinated with the land use element.3°2 Specifically,
the circulation element must correlate the land use element with "the
general location and extent of existing and proposed major thorough-
fares, transportation routes, terminals, and other local public utilities and
facilities .... ,,301 Finally, other transportation elements may be in-
297. Transportation Funding-Katz-Kopp-Baker-Campbell Transportation Blueprint for
the Twenty-First Century, ch. 106, §§ 1-27, 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. 863, 864-86 (West).
298. See Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990 (amending CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 65088-65089.6 (West Supp. 1991)) (approved by voter initiative on June 5,
1990).
299. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65089 (West Supp. 1991).
300. Id.
301. Id. § 65302(b).
302. Id.; see also Concerned Citizens v. Calaveras County Bd. of Supervisors, 166 Cal. App.
3d 90, 99-100, 212 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (1985) (circulation element and land use plan must be
consistent).
303. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(b).
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cluded, such as location of rights-of-way, terminals, viaducts and grade
separations.3 4
B. Florida
Florida's far-reaching Local Government Comprehensive Planning
and Land Development Regulation Act (the Florida Act),305 adopted in
1985,306 requires local governments to prepare and adopt a traffic circula-
tion element and, if applicable, a mass transit element.30 7 The traffic cir-
culation element must describe "the types, locations, and extent of
existing and proposed major thoroughfares and transportation routes, in-
cluding bicycle and pedestrian ways."' 30 8 Furthermore, the Department
of Community Affairs, charged with administering the Florida Act,3 9
requires (1) an inventory of existing facilities; (2) levels of service based
on roadway design capacities; and, (3) expansion needs, as well as pro-
spective needs, based on the Future Land Use map and adopted LOS
standards. 310 The transportation goals and policies must consider the
plans of MPOs, public transportation authorities, regional plans and the
State Transportation Department's five-year plan.311 LOS is based on
peak-hour traffic.312
The LOS standards required in the traffic circulation element must
be coordinated with a schedule of capital improvements contained in a
separate element of the comprehensive plan.3" 3 The capital improve-
ments element contains principles for the construction and extension of
public facilities, elimination of facility deficiencies, costs and revenue
sources and LOS standards.314
In turn, the LOS standards are given "teeth" through the
mandatory "concurrency" requirement. The concurrency requirement
demands that transportation facilities be available, as measured by
adopted LOS standards, concurrent with the impacts of new develop-
304. Id. § 65303.
305. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161-.3215 (West 1989).
306. Ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. I.aws 207 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161-
.3215 (West 1990)).
307. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(3), (6)(b), (7)(b).
308. Id § 163.3177(6)0b).
309. Id. § 163.3177(9)-(10).
310. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.007 (1990).
311. Id r. 9J-5.007(b).
312. Id r. 9J-5.007(4)(c)(1).
313. Id r. 9J-5.007(3)(A)-(B).
314. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(3).
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merit.315 Local governments are not permitted to issue any development
order that would cause a reduction in adopted LOS standards.316
C. Maine
The Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act (the
Maine Act),317 adopted in 1989, 318 requires local governments to adopt a
growth management program.31 9 The Maine Act established a "top-
down" process, 320 as in Florida.32 1 Local comprehensive plans are re-
viewed for consistency with the statutory goals and guidelines by the
state Office of Comprehensive Land Use Planning.322 The statutory
goals include: (1) the efficient use of public services and facilities;
(2) the prevention of urban sprawl; and, (3) the development of an "effi-
cient system of public facilities and services., 323 Other state agencies,
including the Department of Transportation, must conduct their activi-
ties in a manner consistent with the goals of the Maine Act. 32 4 Imple-
mentation of the goals established at the state and regional level,
however, lies primarily with local governments.325 Funds for the im-
provement, expansion or construction of public facilities may only be al-
located to municipalities with adopted comprehensive plans and
implementation programs.
326
Comprehensive planning and implementation requirements include
urban service areas,3 27 regional coordination,328 impact fees329 and tem
porary moratoria.330 Local governments must inventory and analyze ex-
isting transportation systems, including roadway capacities and
pedestrian and parking facilities.331 They must also assess the capital
facilities needed to "support growth and development and to protect the
315. Id. §§ 163.3177(10)(h), 163.3202(2)(g).
316. Id; see supra note 139.
317. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4311-4344 (West Supp. 1990).
318. Ch. 187, 1989 Me. Laws 447 (codified as amended at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A,
§§ 4311-4344 (Supp. 1990)).
319. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4324(1).
320. Id. § 4324(1)-(9).
321. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (West 1990).
322. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4343(2).
323. Id. § 4312(3)(A)-(B).
324. Id. § 4342(2)(G).
325. Id. § 4324.
326. Id. § 4344(8).
327. Id. § 4326(1).
328. Id § 4326(4).
329. Id § 4354.
330. Id § 4356.
331. Id § 4326(1)(G).
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environment and health, safety and welfare of the public and the costs of
those facilities." '332 Each local government must develop an implementa-
tion strategy dividing the jurisdiction into growth areas and rural
areas.333 The strategy must also provide for a CIP for public facilities
serving new growth and development.334 A regional coordination pro-
gram must be prepared to manage shared facilities, such as transporta-
tion facilities, to foster uniformity with the comprehensive plans of other
local governments.335
The Maine Act offers critical funding support for local growth man-
agement systems. It allows creation of a "municipal growth manage-
ment and capital investment fund" to assist local governments in
carrying out the legislation's mandates.336
D. New Jersey
While growth management is generally seen as a "sunbelt" issue,
New Jersey became the first industrial state to enact a comprehensive,
state wide planning system in 1985 (the New Jersey Act).337 The state's
experience with traffic congestion resulted from inefficient growth pat-
terns, rapid suburbanization and increasing reliance on the automobile.
New Jersey has a tradition of regional planning, which has generally
been limited to areas of environmental concern.338 Its courts have devel-
oped the most extensive "regional general welfare" doctrine of any
state.339  A State Development Guide Plan, developed by the State De-
332. Id. § 4326(1)(K).
333. Id. § 4326(3)(A).
334. Id. § 4326(3)(B).
335. Id. § 4326(4).
336. Municipal Growth Management and Capital Investment-Fund and Programs, ch.
631, § 3, 1990 Me. Legis. Serv. 29, 29-31 (to be codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 13112-13114).
337. State Planning Act, ch. 398, §§ 1-12, 1985 N.J. Laws 1674, 1675-82 (codified as
amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-196 to -207 (West Supp. 1990)) (effective Jan. 2,
1986); see also Guskind, New Jersey Says, 'Enough', PLANNING, June 1988, at 24, 25-26 (pre-
dicting that New Jersey's move will catalyze the rest of the United States into action); Law-
rence, New Jersey's Controversial Growth Plan, URB. LAND, Jan. 1988, at 18, 18.
338. See, e.g., Hackensack Meadows Reclamation and Development Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:18A-1 to -49 (West Supp. 1990); Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); see also Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v.
State, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973) (upholding Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and
Development Act); Orleans Builders & Developers v. Byrne, 186 N.J. Super. 432, 453 A.2d
200 (1982) (upholding Pinelands Protection Act).
339. New Jersey requires all local governments to consider regional housing needs when
developing and implementing local land use controls. See Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 209-10, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983) [herein-
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partment of Community Affairs in 1980, identified areas in the state suit-
able for growth, limited growth, and agricultural and environmental
preservation.3 °
The New Jersey Act implemented a cooperative, statewide planning
process to "conserve [New Jersey's] natural resources, revitalize its urban
areas, protect the quality of its environment, and provide needed housing
and adequate public services at a reasonable cost while promoting benefi-
cial economic growth, development and renewal...."'341 The legislation
established a State Planning Commission charged with: (1) developing a
State Development and Redevelopment Plan (SDRP) for statewide
growth and development, including the designation of areas most appro-
priate for growth, and (2) an Infrastructure Needs Assessment to pro-
vide information on the conditions, needs and costs of public facilities,
including transportation.342
The SDRP ensures adequate public facilities, including transporta-
tion, in several ways. First, it includes mechanisms to encourage devel-
opment in areas where infrastructure can be provided with minimal
public costs. 343 Second, the SDRP identifies areas for growth and limited
growth.3 4 Finally, it establishes statewide planning objectives for land
use, transportation and public facilities and services.345
Traffic congestion served as a major impetus for the adoption of the
SDRP. Due to rapid development in commercial corridors and bur-
geoning residential suburban growth, sixty percent of the state's urban
arterials were operating at or above peak capacity in 1985.346 Several
public opinion polls revealed deep concern over deteriorating traffic con-
after Mount Laurel Il]; Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 724 [hereinafter Mount Laurel I], cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975). In order to implement the mandates of Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II, the state
legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act in 1985. Fair Housing Act, ch. 222, §§ 1-28, 31, 1985
N.J. Laws 966, 966-91, 993-94 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -
329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990)). This Act was upheld in Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 25, 510 A.2d 621, 634 (1986).
340. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-15.52 (West 1979). In Mount Laurel II, the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied upon the plan to determine the housing obligations of local governments
consistent with the regional general welfare doctrine. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 247-48, 456
A.2d at 435.
341. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-196(a) (West Supp. 1990).
342. Id. § 52:18A-199(a)-(b).
343. Id. § 52:18A-200.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. 1 N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF PLACE: A LEGACY FOR THE
NEXT GENERATION 7 (1988).
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ditions. 47 A budget of $13.8 billion, spread over twenty-five years, was
assigned to provide facilities needed to serve projected growth. 34" An
additional $750 million was allocated to accommodate existing traffic
demands.349
To combat escalating traffic congestion and automobile dependency,
the preliminary SDRP included a tiered growth control system and a
nodes and corridors strategy. The nodes and corridors strategy directed
new growth and development toward areas that could be efficiently
served by existing roadway and transit facilities. At the same time, the
strategy attempted to draw growth away from outlying areas and to con-
solidate development into mixed-use nodes, where development pressures
are highest and transit can be provided in an efficient and cost-effective
manner.
350
The SDRP embraces the concurrency concept, encouraging local
governments to develop adequate public facilities regulations to restrict
347. GALLUP ORG., NEW JERSEY LAND USE PLANNING: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION
(New Jersey State Planning Commission Technical Reference Document No. 86-3, 1986);
RUTGERS UNIV. EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEREST POLLING, THE
CROWDED ROAD: A SURVEY OF NEW JERSEYANS' OPINIONS ABOUT TRANSPORTATION,
GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT 13 (1988) (prepared for the New Jersey Department of
Transportation).
348. Guskind, supra note 337, at 26.
349. Id
350. 1 N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, supra note 346, at 11, 18-19. The seven tiers were
divided into "Growth Areas" and "Limited Growth Areas." The Growth Areas included:
Tier One-Redeveloping Cities and Suburbs;
Tier Two-Stable Cities and Suburbs;
Tier Three-Suburban and Rural Towns; and
Tier Four-Suburbanizing Areas.
Id at 19-20. The Limited Growth Areas included:
Tier Five-Future Suburbanizing Areas;
Tier Six-Agricultural Areas; and
Tier Seven-Environmentally Sensitive Areas.
Id at 20. In developing the tier system, the State Planning Commission examined several
alternative growth scenarios, such as the continuation of existing trends, policies concentrating
growth in existing urban areas, and corridors and nodes. Id. at 11. The corridors and nodes
scenario was selected as the most desirable, since corridor growth would not compete with
urban growth and because corridor growth would also encourage growth in a manner service-
able by public transit. Id at 13.
After identifying the state's growth management goals, the State Planning Commission
considered four alternative implementation systems. The alternatives were: (1) the current
system of fragmented local land use decision-making; (2) a "facility driven" system granting
service providers primary responsibility for growth management; (3) an "areas of critical con-
cern" strategy, with all levels of government participating in protecting environmentally criti-
cal areas; and, (4) the tier system, defined as "gradations of levels of public service based upon
desirable intensities of use necessary to achieve both public service efficiency and environmen-
tal quality goals." Id. at 19. The tier system was selected as the most versatile system for
achieving the multiple objectives of New Jersey's planning system. Id.
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the level of development to that serviceable by existing and planned pub-
lic services.351 Detailed policies coordinate land use and transportation,
using public-private partnerships to encourage development in transpor-
tation corridors. Such policies encourage the development of multi-mo-
dal transportation systems and describe TDM regulations encouraging
non-peak-hour travel and ridesharing. These policies also require new
development applicants to submit transportation impact statements, inte-
grate capital investment and expansion policies to encourage more effi-
cient development patterns, and acquire abandoned rights-of-way to
preserve rights-of-way for future transit facilities.352
While the SDRP goals and objectives have gained widespread sup-
port from both business and environmental interests, the New Jersey Act
has been criticized for lacking an adequate enforcement mechanism.
35 3
Local governments are not required to implement the state plan.354 In-
stead, the plan's primary implementation mechanism is a negotiated
"cross-acceptance" procedure, whereby areas of agreement or disagree-
ment with state planning objectives are included in local plans.355 While
the state policies contain detailed directions for transportation master
plans based upon LOS standards,356 these plans are not mandated by the
state.
357
Recognizing the critical role that transportation plays in the devel-
opment of a coordinated regional growth management system, the legis-
lature amended the New Jersey Act to ensure the multi-jurisdictional
development of transportation corridors consistent with comprehensive
planning requirements. 58 The 1989 legislation allows the State Depart-
ment of Transportation, at the request of a county, to designate a
transportation development district (TDD).359 A transportation im-
351. 2 N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF PLACE: STRATEGIES AND POL-
ICIES 7 (1988); 3 N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF PLACE: PLANNING
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES 1-28 to 1-29 (1989) (Policy 1.3).
352. 2 N.J. STATE PLANNING CoMM'N, supra note 351, at 14-15 (Policies 1.1-2.9); 3 N.J.
STATE PLANNING COMM'N, supra note 351, at 1-79 to 1-98 (Policies 1.1-2.9).
353. Comment, Statewide Planning in New Jersey: Putting Some Teeth into the State Plan-
ning Act, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 722 (1989).
354. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-202 (West Supp. 1990).
355. Id.
356. 3 N.J. STATE PLANNING COMM'N, supra note 351, at 1-79 to 1-84 (Policies 1.1 & 1.3).
357. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-202.
358. New Jersey Transportation Development District Act of 1989, ch. 100, 1989 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. 317 (West) (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:1C-1 to -18 (West Supp.
1990)). See generally R. Freilich, Comments on New Jersey Transportation Development Dis-
trict Act (Nov. 1, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view) (in-depth analysis of draft version of act).
359. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-1.
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provement plan (TIP) is then developed within the TDD.31 The TIP
must be consistent with the SDRP, the State Transportation Master Plan
and local master plans.361 The State Department of Transportation may
designate a TDD upon the failure or refusal of a county to do so.
362
Development impact fees represent the primary implementation
mechanism for the TDD.3 63 The Department of Transportation may
prescribe a formula to calculate impact fees, and impact fees may not be
used to fund existing infrastructure deficiencies. 36 The impact fees may
be reduced to promote related public policies.3 65 Such public policies
include efficient development patterns in core areas and peak-hour auto-
mobile trip reduction plans submitted by developers.366 Mixed use devel-
opments or developments located near labor pools may adopt a peak-
hour automobile trip reduction plan and receive reduced impact fee as-
sessments.3 67 Affordable housing projects constructed pursuant to the
Fair Housing Act 368 are exempt from the impact fee provisions. 369 Fi-
nally, intergovernmental coordination is authorized for TIP planning
and construction of public facilities.37°
E. Oregon
The Oregon Land Use Goals and Guidelines Regulations establish a
Public Facilities and Services Element goal,371 as well as a Transporta-
tion goal.372 Goal 14 requires local governments to delineate urban
growth boundaries.373 Within these urban growth boundaries, public fa-
cilities and services are extended to separate urbanizable from rural
land.3 14 Capital investment policies buttress the separation of urban ar-
eas from non-urban areas. The boundary requires local governments to
360. Id. § 27:1C-5.
361. Id. §§ 27:1C-4(a)(4), :lC-5(b).
362. Id. § 27:1C-13(a).
363. Id. § 27:1C-7.
364. Id. § 27:1C-8.
365. Id. § 27:IC-7(f).
366. Id. These reduction plans may include site designs which accommodate transit facili-
ties, as well as ridesharing and pedestrian-access designs. Id.
367. Id.
368. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:2713-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990).
369. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301.
370. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-12.
371. OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM'N, supra note 50, Goal 11.
372. Id. Goal 12.
373. Id. Goal 14.
374. Id.
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design and locate transportation facilities to encourage growth in urban-
ized areas and discourage growth in rural areas. 7
The transportation section emphasizes the relationship between
transportation and land use.376 Specifically, the number and location of
transportation facilities must be consistent with "state or local land use
plans and policies designed to direct urban expansion to areas identified
as necessary and suitable for urban development. ' 377 Plans for new facil-
ities or the expansion of existing facilities must identify the impact on
local land use patterns and existing transportation systems.378 Further-
more, the planning of transportation systems with land development pol-
icies favoring the use of existing transportation facilities is encouraged.379
One innovative provision of Goal 12 requires the improvement of
transportation services for the "transportation disadvantaged. ' 380 This
requirement should reduce reliance on transportation systems centered
on the automobile.
F. Vermont
Vermont has a relatively long-standing tradition of regional growth
management. A statewide land use regulation scheme, adopted in
1970,38 created a state environment board and several District Environ-
mental Commissions to review development proposals.382 This statute
requires the board to consider the development's financial capacity to
accommodate both the total growth and the rate of growth resulting
from new development, including highway access and maintenance
costs. 38 3 In an administrative hearing involving the issuance of the per-
mit, the developer bears the burden of proof if the local government has a
CIP. 38 4
375. Id. Guideline 14(B)(2). These transportation facilities include air, marine, rail, mass
transit, highways, bicycle and pedestrian facilities. Id. Guideline 14(B)(2).
376. See id Goal 12.
377. Id. Guideline 12(B)(1).
378. kd Guideline 12(B)(2).
379. l Guideline 12(A)(2).
380. Id Goal 12. The "transportation disadvantaged" are defined as "those individuals
who have difficulty in obtaining transportation because of their age, income, physical or mental
disability." Id. Goal 12. In contrast to Goal 12, transportation networks relying primarily on
automobiles fail to consider the needs of those who are physically unable to drive or financially
unable to afford automobiles. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.011-.017 (West 1986 & Supp.
1991).
381. Act 250, ch. 151, 1969 Vt. Laws 250 (Adjourned Sess.) (codified as amended at VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6108 (1984 & Supp. 1990)).
382. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6021-6044 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
383. Id. § 6086(a)(9)(A).
384. Id. § 6088.
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Vermont's growth management scheme adopts statewide planning
goals and criteria, provides for the creation of regional planning agencies
and authorizes local governments to adopt comprehensive plans.38 5 Im-
pact fees may require new development to pay a proportionate share of
new growth-related facilities.3" 6 The state goals permit local govern-
ments to control the rate and location of development to ensure that new
development does not "exceed the ability of [local governments] to pro-
"1387vide facilities and services.
The state goals discourage scattered development and encourage
compact urban growth.3"' To mitigate the physical and visual impact of
highway construction, transportation facilities may be expanded only
within existing rights-of-way. 3 9 Furthermore, transportation elements
of regional390 and local391 comprehensive plans are required. These ele-
ments must depict present and proposed facilities, as well as prioritized
CIPs. 392 Regional planning commissions may undertake capacity studies
for transportation 393 to measure the potential of transportation facilities
to absorb land development.394
G. Washington
Washington recently passed growth management and planning leg-
islation (the Washington Act).395 The legislation seeks to reduce urban
sprawl by encouraging growth where "adequate public facilities and serv-
ices can be provided in an efficient manner."'3 96 The Washington Act
also endeavors to provide "efficient multimodal transportation systems"
and to "[e]nsure that those public facilities and services necessary to sup-
port development shall be adequate to serve the development at the time
the development is available for occupancy and use without decreasing
current service levels below locally established minimum standards.
397
385. Vermont Planning and Development Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4495 (1975
& Supp. 1990).
386. Id. §§ 5200-5206.
387. Id. § 4302(c)(12)(B).
388. Id. § 4302(c)(1).
389. See id § 4302(4)(A).
390. Id. § 4348(a).
391. Id § 4382(a)(3).
392. IM
393. Id. § 4325(4).
394. Id § 4303(20).
395. Act approved Apr. 24, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1375 (West).
396. Id. § 2(1), at 1375.
397. Id. § 2(12), at 1375-76.
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Thus, the Washington legislation recognizes the concurrency concept
and its implementation at the local level of government.
Cities and counties with specified population and growth rate char-
acteristics must adopt a comprehensive plan, including a mandatory
transportation element containing comprehensive structural, financial
and police power strategies founded on concurrency principles.398 The
transportation element must include: (1) an inventory of land use as-
sumptions pertaining to travel; (2) an inventory of facilities and services
needs, including LOS standards, actions for correcting LOS deficiencies
and the relationship between the location, timing and capacity needs of
future traffic based upon the land use plan; (3) a financial element identi-
fying funding sources and needs; (4) intergovernmental coordination ef-
forts; and, (5) demand-management strategies, including ordinances
prohibiting development approvals which would reduce the adopted
levels of service.399
Development may proceed if transportation improvements or trip
reduction strategies are available concurrent with the development.'
This concurrency requirement is satisfied if either the improvements or
strategies are in place at the time of development or if a financial commit-
ment has been made to complete the improvements within six years."'
Additionally, the comprehensive planning process incorporates
structural techniques by providing for the use of transportation corr-
dors.' 2 Furthermore, the comprehensive plan must identify "lands use-
ful for public purposes," including transportation corridors. °3 Detailed
revisions were made to the impact fee enabling legislation to ensure that
the impact fees are calculated and assessed in accordance with constitu-
tional principles and that "adequate facilities are available to serve new
growth and development."'  The Washington Act expressly recognizes
the continuing authority of local governments to impose transportation
398. Id. § 7(6), at 1379-80. Section 4 provides that the Act applies only to (1) counties
exceeding populations of 50,000 and with a 10-year historic growth rate exceeding 10%, and
(2) counties experiencing growth rates exceeding 20% in the preceding 10 years. Id. § 4, at
1377.
399. Id. § 7(6), at 1379-80. The latter requirement is similar to the "concurrency" require-
ment imposed by Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Develop-
ment Regulation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (West 1990).
400. Act approved Apr. 24, 1990, ch. 17, § 7(6), 1990 Wash. Legis. Serv. at 1380. Trans-
portation improvements or trip reduction strategies include public transportation service, ride
sharing programs, demand management and other transportation systems management strate-
gies. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. § 15, at 1382.
403. Id.
404. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050(I)(a) (Supp. 1991).
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impact fees4°5 pursuant to section 39.92 of the Revised Code of
Washington.
40
6
The growth management legislation establishes a regional transpor-
tation planning process recognizing the multi-jurisdictional control and
interconnectedness of the state transportation system.4 7 The statute es-
tablishes regional transportation planning organizations, 408 and local
transportation plans must be consistent with the regional transportation
plan.409 Finally, comprehensive road programs consistent with the com-
prehensive plan must be created at the county and municipal level.410
VI. CONCLUSION
Decentralized land development patterns, increases in per capita au-
tomobile usage, and the continued growth and development in metropol-
itan areas will cause traffic congestion problems to continue to escalate.
Cities must plan for this problem by following a multi-dimensional ap-
proach. An effective transportation management program, however, re-
quires extensive study, political compromises and careful
implementation. During a real estate boom, vested rights issues and time
pressures may impede efforts to develop a transportation management
program. Thus, jurisdictions experiencing declines in real estate activity
are well advised to plan for growth before the next upsurgence in real
estate activity exacerbates congestion.
This Article has focused on the significant problems that federal,
state, regional and local governments encounter when addressing the
transportation congestion problem. Although each technique plays a sig-
nificant role in resolving the crisis facing rapidly growing metropolitan
areas, the full panoply of growth management techniques must be un-
leashed to combat traffic congestion.
405. Id. § 82.02.020.
406. Id.
407. Act approved Apr. 24, 1990, ch. 17, §§ 53-60, 1990 Wash. Legis. Serv. at 1397-1401.
408. Id § 54, at 1398.
409. Id
410. Id §§ 57-60, at 1399-1401.
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